

10/14 - BIA on Soviet assistance:
"As far as the military assistance of the Soviet Union is concerned, it should be stressed that such assistance does exist." It is needed to repel "foreign interferences" but it in no way contradicts the Geneva accords. The LAT put it this way:

Afghanistan said it still has Soviet military advisers but that they are only in Kabul province and are not involved in fighting Western-backed rebels. A Foreign Ministry statement broadcast by official Kabul Radio denied U.S. charges that Soviet military personnel still seemed to be aiding government forces. It said the advisers are there "for technical acquaintance with weapons, but they do not take part in operating the weapons."

- BIA - Soviet wrestling advisers will supervise a 10-day course for wrestling trainers at the Amani Lycee in Kabul.

- Najibullah has ordered the "re-transfer of the announcement of the state of emergency" from the Council of Ministers to the Nat'l Assembly since a "relative favorable state prevails in the country."



■ Mr. Najibullah ...

10/15 - BIA - The DYOA produced 13 video-cassette films this year.

- The solar energy unit of the road maintenance dept. was inaugurated. The unit has 44 collectors & generates 446 kws of energy on a sunny day.

10/16 - BIA - The USSR will send 47,000 "clearing dollars" worth of water pumps to Kabul City to "keep the parks of the city cleaned & green."

10/17 - BIA - A Spaniard named Khrisio Khman Sanjir Garcia [sic] was sentenced to 5 years in prison for spying. He was captured on 7/30 near Kandahar.

10/18 - BIA - The new Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan is B. Nikolae-vish Pastoukhov.

10/22 - NYT - UN officials are worried that many displaced people in Afghan cities may suffer another winter with too little to eat. Despite large amounts of wheat from the USSR that have been stockpiled, the fighting has prevented enough food from getting through. Locusts in northern Afghanistan this summer ate part of the Afghan crop.

United Nations officials say they have commitments from Italy and West Germany to provide food that will probably be sent by train. But they say the United Nations has only about 10,000 tons of the 30,000 tons it wants. The Soviet Union, the Afghanistan Government's major ally, donated 7,000 of the 10,000 tons.

The United Nations plans to supervise the distribution through Government health dispensaries and the Afghan Red Crescent. The food is intended for the small children, pregnant and nursing mothers, and aged, sick or crippled people among the poor and displaced who have been driven by the fighting to Kabul and other cities.



Eduard A. Shevardnadze ...

This excerpt from the AP translation of the speech appeared in the 10/25 NYT.

When more than 100 U.N. members for a number of years were condemning our action, what other evidence did we need to realize that we had set ourselves against all of humanity, violated norms of behavior, ignored universal human values?

I am referring of course to our military engagement in Afghanistan. It should teach us a lesson that in this case, gross violations of our own laws, intraparty and civil norms and ethics were allowed.

At the time I am speaking about, M. S. Gorbachev and I were candidate members of the Politburo. I found out about what had happened from radio and newspaper reports. A decision that had very serious consequences for our country was made behind the back of the party and the people. We were confronted with a fait accompli.

"We're not concerned about feeding the populations of the cities; that's the responsibility of the Government," said Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, United Nations coordinator for humanitarian relief for Afghanistan. "We are concerned about the vulnerable groups who may be bypassed." * * *

So far this year he and his staff of 25, based in Geneva, have coordinated the spending of about \$100 million on the distribution of food, seeds and fertilizer and other relief supplies to about 250,000 people inside Afghanistan. Most of the aid was donated by the Soviet Union.

With Soviet approval, the aid has gone to towns and cities in Government hands, and to the rebel-held country-side.

10/24 - NYT - Shevardnadze told the Soviet legislature it was all a mistake:

Since the withdrawal of Soviet combat units from Afghanistan was completed in February, Soviet press commentators have written about the 1979 intervention, which cost 13,000 Soviet lives, as a mistake or an immoral act.

But no high official has publicly condemned the decision as sharply as Mr. Shevardnadze did today.

"We violated the norms of proper behavior," he said. "We went against general human values. I am talking, of course, about the dispatch of troops to Afghanistan. We committed the most serious violations of our own legislation, our party and civilian norms." * * *

Mr. Shevardnadze did not explicitly address the question of what role Moscow had played in the coup that led to the introduction of Soviet forces. Nor did he take note of recent American assertions that at least 300 Soviet military advisers remain in Afghanistan, manning missile batteries south of Kabul and wearing Afghan Army uniforms. The Soviet Government has denied the accusations and invited foreign observers, including Americans, to investigate for themselves.

The Soviet Union continues to provide military aid to the Afghan Government and says it will continue to do so until the United States stops supplying arms to the Afghan rebel forces. In his speech, Mr. Shevardnadze went out of his way to praise the Afghan Government of President Najibullah.

Pakistan concerned at refugee aid cuts

By Christina Lamb in Islamabad

THE Pakistan Government is becoming increasingly concerned over drastic cuts in Western aid to Afghan refugees. Officials complain of an almost \$15m (£9.3m) cash shortfall from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and say they urgently need a further \$200m assistance for commodities and transport.

A delegation led by Mr Happy Minwalla, Ambassador at Large to the Pakistan Government, has left to tour Europe and America to request help.

Mr Minwalla says: "We fear that with the decline in Western interest since the Soviet troops withdrew, we will be left with the entire burden of supporting the world's largest refugee population".

The cost of looking after more than 3.8m refugees living in 345 camps is more than \$1m a day, of which Pakistan at present provides 46 per cent, the UNHCR 16 per cent, the World Food Programme (WFP) 33 per cent, and other donors 5 per cent.

The crisis has come about because the UNHCR, which

has been providing aid since 1980, has a \$100m deficit and is cutting back on all programmes by at least 10 per cent.

This means that Pakistan, one of the largest recipients, has been told to make additional savings of \$4m. The programme had already been slashed to \$35.19m, compared to \$43.7m last year, and far less than the \$46m Pakistan requested.

Instead of the predicted return of refugees to Afghanistan, 67,635 more have arrived. Four new camps have been set up, costing the extra \$9m.

UNHCR suggested that money could be saved by cutting various projects and stopping supplies of kerosene, a prospect which horrifies Pakistan, which fears further deforestation of its already denuded forests.

In a letter to Mr Jean-Pierre Hoch, head of UNHCR, a Pakistani government representative said: "We are utterly disturbed by these developments. There has been no material change in the refugee situation. Substantial repatriation is nowhere in sight."

Financial Times 9/9

Surprise appointment in Afghanistan 'justified'

KABUL: The Afghan Government said the surprise appointment of the brother of former Afghan President Barakat Karmal to the post of first deputy premier was made because "he now agrees with the policy of national reconciliation".

The appointment of Mr Mahmoud Baryalai, 44, who has just been released from jail, was placed last year in favour of a military solution to the Afghan war, was announced at the weekend on state television.

No explanation was given at the time, but government spokesman Mohammad Nabi Amani said that Mr Baryalai "was one of those who seriously rejected the policy of national reconciliation, he was in favour of the military option, these grounds he was put in jail for a while".

"But time has lapsed," Mr Amani said, "there have been (party) sacrifices and the policy of national reconciliation has been successful, and Mr Baryalai had declared his support of the policy (of national reconciliation)".

Asked whether Mr Baryalai would be more senior to Sultan Ali Keshmand, the man considered de facto prime minister after the dismissal of Mr Hassan Sharq from the post last February, Mr Amani said: "It is difficult to say".

Mr Baryalai was party director of foreign relations under his brother Mr Karmal, who ruled Afghanistan from 1979 to 1986, when General Najibullah took the reins of power.

Mr Karmal, now in exile in the Soviet Union, is considered the man responsible

for the Soviet troop invasion of Afghanistan.

When Soviet troops pulled out of Afghanistan in February, Mr Baryalai was in jail, and non-party members of the Government were dismissed and replaced by members of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDP).

The Mujahedeen resistance has been fighting the Soviet-backed Government in Kabul for the past 10 years.

They have demanded that General Najibullah and his party step down if a peaceful settlement is to be reached.

One source close to the Government said there was speculation that Mr Baryalai would take up the position of "shadow foreign minister".

SCMP 6/27

Prices of essential commodities in Kabul on
20 August 1989

Rice	1800 Af/ <i>Seer</i>
Ghee	2850 Af/ <i>Seer</i>
Peas	950 Af/ <i>Seer</i>
Beans	2450 Af/ <i>Seer</i>
Sugar	3220 Af/ <i>Seer</i>
Beef	4200 Af/ <i>Seer</i>
Lamb	5250 Af/ <i>Seer</i>
Tea	12600 Af/ <i>Seer</i>
Corn	900 Af/ <i>Seer</i>
Tomato	400 Af/ <i>Seer</i>
Potato	300 Af/ <i>Seer</i>
Onion	300 Af/ <i>Seer</i>
Melon	400 Af/ <i>Seer</i>
Diesel oil	500 Af/gallon
Petrol	1200 Af/gallon
Charcoal	1690 Af/ <i>Seer</i>
Wood fuel	320 Af/ <i>Seer</i>
National bus fare inside city	4 Af/person
Private buses	10 Af/person
Loaf of Bread	14 Af
Loaf of suio Bread	40 Af

* *Seer* is a unit of weight equal to 7 kilograms.
*200 Afghani is exchanged with one US dollar.

AFGHANews

October 1, 1989

Soviets stockpile food for Afghans

KABUL: Massive Soviet aid will ensure Afghanistan does not starve during the harsh winter despite Mujahedeen rebel control over much of the countryside, a top government official said.

"You should be confident that the Soviet Union will not leave us in hunger," First Deputy Prime Minister Mahmood Baryalai told foreign reporters.

He said Kabul had stockpiled 25,000 tonnes of wheat from the Soviet Union to see the city through the winter.

"We have completed our foodstuff preparations for the winter," he said.

International relief agencies say Kabul needs to put away at least another 60,000 tonnes before the roads ice over.

Tens of thousands of people are leaving the capital every month as prices soar in markets ahead of winter and merchants and traders begin to hoard, aid workers say.

Mr Baryalai said the government was distributing 500 tonnes of food a day to the 1.5 million

ration card-holders in Kabul, which has a population of around two million.

"As for reserves, the danger of last winter we do not face this winter," Mr Baryalai said.

Some 40 Aeroflot cargo planes fly into Kabul each day with 5,000 tonnes of goods from the Soviet Union.

The planes take off and land in a tight corkscrew pattern and send out magnesium flares to avoid the rockets and heat-seeking missiles fired by Mujahedeen guerrillas from the hills around the capital.

A convoy of about 1,300 trucks and military vehicles taking food and weapons to the key southern city of Kandahar has apparently stalled.

Mr Baryalai said the convoy had been attacked by rebel rockets and "two or three vehicles" had been damaged.

"Our opponents are not sitting idle," he said.

"They know that if the convoy gets through they will lose the balance of forces."

- Reuter

HK Standard 9/11

Afghan Ex-King's Political Star Rises

By Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady

ZAHIR SHAH, the ex-king of Afghanistan, has been the major beneficiary of every military stalemate in the war in Afghanistan. The refusal of the Kabul government before 1986, and of the resistance since 1987, to negotiate with each other, has strengthened Zahir Shah's bid for power as a compromise solution to the conflict. Since the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, the inability of the *mujahideen* and the government forces to defeat each other, combined with increasing civilian casualties, have led to more calls for a political solution. Consequently, Zahir Shah's political star has been rising.

A senior US official recently met with the former king, who is also discussing with the government of Benazir Bhutto the possibility of meeting with Afghan rebel leaders in Pakistan. All of this has been welcomed by the Kabul regime.

Zahir Shah is immensely popular. According to a 1987 poll, over 70 percent of the refugees in Pakistan prefer Zahir Shah to any other Afghan politician. His popularity among Afghans inside the country and émigré communities in the West is probably even greater. He stands for Afghan nationalism, traditional Islam, government of law, a considerable degree of political freedom, socioeconomic modernization, and a mixed economy.

He is also popular because of the unpopularity of his rivals — communists and fundamentalists. Oppression, genocide, destruction, economic chaos, lawlessness, atheism, and foreign (Soviet) rule constitute the legacy of communism. Similarly, Islamic fundamentalism, which negates Afghan nationalism, emphasizes radical Islam instead of traditional Islam, and is rather insensitive to human rights and political freedom, is not very popular.

Of course, Zahir Shah has very powerful adversaries too: Afghan fundamentalists, Pakistan, and Iran. Because of the strategic importance of Pakistan in the war against the Kabul government, the United States and Saudi Arabia endorse Pakistan's support for the Afghan fundamentalists, which (until now, at least) has meant opposition to Zahir Shah. Willingness to meet with the former king may indicate a change in US policy, however.

Zahir Shah's problem has been compounded by his do-nothing policy. Militarily weak, he does not have any activist strategy and organization which would transform his popularity into a major po-

litical force. His policy of wait-and-see has allowed his fundamentalist opponents to dominate the political agenda.

While this minimum-risk approach has helped Zahir Shah to survive physically (no assassination attempts) and politically, it has also made it very difficult for him to take advantage of political opportunities. Following the Soviet withdrawal, Kabul was extremely nervous about its future. The communists were ready for major concessions. Indeed, they begged Zahir Shah to accept the transfer of power in return for minor communist participation in government.

Zahir Shah was apprehensive that any negotiation with the government would be considered treasonous by the fundamentalists. Furthermore, he believed that without US and Pakistani support for such a deal the war would not end. Zahir Shah could have used the withdrawal of Soviet forces and replacement of the communist regime as historic achievements well worth the concession to allow minor communist participation in government. Zahir Shah could also mobilize his supporters in favor of peace, thus pressuring the US and Pakistan to endorse his initiative. However, his risk-averse personality prevented him from taking advantage of that opportunity. Consequently, as the strategy of military resolution of the conflict prevailed be-

tween early 1988 and the summer of 1989, Zahir Shah's star waned, too.

But the *mujahideen* have not been able to prevail, and a stalemate exists. This has led to increased domestic and international support for a political solution. Consequently, Zahir Shah's fortune has been rising. He is still immensely popular. Although the negotiating position of the government has improved substantially, Zahir Shah is still probably acceptable to Kabul and its Soviet backers. The lack of a military resolution, combined with the unpopularity of rebel attacks on cities and the power struggle within the resistance, have reduced the risk of negotiating a settlement.

Zahir Shah is popular enough to survive the negative political repercussion of minor concession to the communists in return for the replacement of the Kabul government. He can also mobilize his supporters in favor of peace and pressure the US and Pakistan to abandon the strategy of military resolution of the conflict — if he demonstrates more political courage than he has thus far.

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run by anti-American Gulbaddin Hekmatyar. "The mujahideen (holy warriors) will not let Zahir Shah come to Afghanistan."

Abdul Rahim, a spokesman for the guerrillas' government-in-exile, said a royal return is tantamount to a rebel defeat. "It would mean the mujahideen and the people of Afghanistan are defeated," said Rahim.

Royalists among the rebels, most notably Syed Gailani's National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, say the king is the only Afghan able to rally warring factions.

Asim Nasser-Zia, a spokesman for Gailani's group, predicted Zahir Shah will fly to Kabul from Rome in January or February and retire after convening a traditional Afghan council to oversee general elections.

This could happen only after Najib was out of Kabul, he said.

Pakistan's army chief of staff, Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, meanwhile, said the Kremlin appears willing to abandon Najib.

He recommended the Afghan resistance negotiate with remnants of the Afghan government after a Soviet sweep of the party.



Frontier Post 9/14

REBELS VOW TO ASSASSINATE KING

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Radical Afghan fundamentalist guerrillas warned yesterday they will assassinate their country's ousted king if he tries to head a postwar government in Kabul.

"He takes a very grave risk of being shot," said Nawab Salim, spokesman for the hard-line Hezb-i-Islami party.

Asbury Park Press 9/18

The CIA Has Bungled It

By Bill McCollum

AFTER 10 YEARS and nearly \$2 billion dollars in American aid, something has gone terribly wrong with the war in Afghanistan. But U.S. lawmakers who want to see the major cause of the problem don't have to hike over the Hindu Kush with the *mujaheddin* rebels; they can simply cross the Potowac River to Langley.

Instead of the swift victory by rebel forces expected once Soviet troops withdrew, Najibullah's pro-Moscow regime remains in power and the war is stalemated. Some blame inept *mujaheddin*, bands of extremist guerrillas or even unexpected strength in the Kabul regime. But the root of the problem lies in America's Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA has secretly pursued a wrong-headed Afghan policy for years. That policy has now culminated in a monumentally incompetent program of arms procurement and distribution, and worse yet, in the handing over of the fate of the Afghan people to Pakistan's bumbling military intelligence service.

Last week the CIA tacitly recognized these failures by reassigning the head of its Afghan Task Force. And yesterday The Washington Post reported that the Bush administration had signaled a possible shift in U.S. policy by making overtures to former Afghan monarch Zahir Shah. The approach to the king is apparently part of a belated effort to shore up the Afghan resistance's faltering interim government now based in Peshawar, Pakistan.

Pakistan's strategic interest in Afghanistan is natural. Its support for the rebels began four years before the 1979 Soviet invasion, when Pakistani agents trained Afghan Moslem activists eager to overthrow Kabul's pro-Soviet President Mohammed Daoud. In 1976, they recruited Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a fire-brand fundamentalist student-leader at Kabul University, who is now—apart from Najibullah's government—the most dangerous threat to the aims of the mujaheddin.

After the Soviet invasion, as millions of Afghans took refuge in Pakistan and their men took up arms, Hekmatyar's party received the majority of weapons, money and other support from Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), their equivalent of the CIA.

Afghans wanting refugee status got quicker registration if they moved into Hekmatyar-run refugee camps. Refugees wanting licenses for their trucks were stalled six months or more unless they joined Hekmatyar's party. And for the next nine years, roughly half of all weapons—provided by America, Europe or the Saudi government—went to Hekmatyar.

While it is the largest resistance group in terms of weapons received, Hekmatyar's faction remains small inside Afghanistan. Unlike the six other mujaheddin groups, his has no ethnic, tribal or regional base. Hekmatyar seeks to defeat the communist regime in Kabul but, just as fiercely, to smash Afghanistan's tribal-family structure and introduce a so-called democratic one-party fundamentalist state with himself at the helm.

This was, and still is, an unpopular position among the traditionalist Afghan people. Despite assurances from Pakistani and U.S. government officials that his group is the largest and most effective militarily, Hekmatyar has attracted a very small group of competent commanders and a somewhat larger collection of rural bandits and would-be warlords. They are choked with supplies but low on competence and zeal—apart from raiding other parties.

One such Hekmatyar warlord recently kidnapped and tortured to death several officers under the command of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the field commander of another fundamentalist party. This was hardly the first such incident. Throughout the war, as much as three-quarters of internecine *mujaheddin* fighting involved Hekmatyar forces.

In Pakistan's border city of Peshawar, where Hekmatyar's cadre is strong and well-disciplined, his party has been implicated in dozens of disappearances and outright murders of people Hekmatyar considers a threat—rival commanders or even moderate Arab intellectuals.

Last spring, when supporters of former king Zahir Shah gathered unarmed in Peshawar, young Hekmatyar toughs brandished 2-by-4s and beat old men present on the dais. Weeks later at a press conference, Hekmatyar laughed and warned that it could certainly happen again. A year ago, he threatened Western journalists with kidnapping if they traveled in Afghanistan without his approval, and at least one Western reporter, traveling with another party, was murdered. Recently, he denounced all journalists as Western spies—remarks roundly criticized even by other so-called fundamentalist leaders.

Many Afghan leaders and Westerners in Peshawar see him not as a "fundamentalist" clone of Ayatollah Khomeini but closer to Libya's power-mad Moammar Gadhafi. After the recent murder of Massoud's troops, the head of the mujaheddin government-in-exile, soft-spoken Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, uncharacteristically denounced Hekmatyar as a criminal.

The reason Hekmatyar gets Pakistani support is his unflinching loyalty to ISI, still manned chiefly by army officers installed by former Pakistan president Zia ul-Haq despite a change at the top engineered by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto this year. Like Zia, the ISI officers admire Hekmatyar's internationalist brand of Islam as much as his political obedience, and what happens in Peshawar or over the border is seen as an internal Afghan affair.

Why the CIA gave ISI its proxy was easier to understand in the beginning. Our intelligence community had little faith in the mujaheddin's ability to drive out the Soviets; for a relatively small sum we could blacken Moscow's eye and get our own back for Vietnam. Even after the mujaheddin showed surprising competence and resolve, Afghanistan would never hold much geopolitical importance for America while Pakistan always will. Throughout the CIA and the State Department, professional reputations were staked on the supposed certainty that Pakistan knew best.

But since about 1985, when complaints against Hekmatyar began mounting from the refugees, the Western press and U.S. lawmakers and government officials repeatedly told us that they had finally "seen the light" and that

Hekmatyar's lion's share of weapons would be reduced. The cut never came.

Indeed, in recent months, as the U.S. Agency for International Development set up its logistics task force for rebuilding post-war Afghanistan, Pakistani pressure ensured that the entire fleet of trucks and command staff was handed to Hekmatyar personnel. If some solution is reached and the refugees return, whatever their party or political viewpoint they will be dependent for food on Hekmatyar's men.

Even so, Hekmatyar is but one symptom of the larger problem: Pakistan's incompetent meddling in the mujaheddin's war.

Apart from Hekmatyar's group as a whole, ISI weapons distributors favor those Afghan commanders they think they can control. If a commander shows signs of independent thinking or refuses to be accompanied by Pakistani military advisers, his supplies are often stopped cold. Other commanders—who refuse the often inept advice of the ISI mid-level officers—get their few weapons from the pitance given to the other six factions, capture what they need or, in some cases, cut deals with independent Arab backers from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

As the Soviets withdrew in February, virtually all mujaheddin commanders favored a continued strategy of wearing down the regime by mountain warfare and guerrilla tactics until the regime crumbled from within. Targeting a single city required a major change from guerrilla tactics to set battles, and once liberated a city could be flattened by Kabul bombers and Scud missiles.

However, the CIA and ISI thought victory was imminent and the Pentagon publicly worried about how to get Stinger missiles back from the mujaheddin. ISI, with CIA backing, demanded a quick frontal assault on Jalalabad to "wrap things up." The result was the protracted and bloody stalemate in Jalalabad. To cover their own strategic ineptitude, both Pakistani and American insiders began laying the blame on the "incompetent" mujaheddin who only a few weeks before had been hailed by the same people as brilliant guerrilla fighters.

Worse yet, Langley's tacticians were so certain they were right that they turned off the arms supply. For the past eight months, virtually nothing has reached the mujaheddin. In Jalalabad, major field commanders are fighting Soviet tanks with nothing more than rocket-propelled grenades, useless against Soviet-made armor which is designed to repel projectiles. They have no Stingers to drive off bombers, nor any controller-guided anti-tank missiles and their casualties fighting the regime have run as high as 25 percent a month.

While U.S. officials say the long-delayed arms shipments should be in mujaheddin hands soon, the resistance fighters have nothing at the moment while Kabul troops continue to be stockpiled by an airlift of some 40 flights a day, plus frequent land convoys from the border.

Over the long haul, there has been even more bungling in CIA military supplies for the mujaheddin. The resistance has never received TOW anti-tank missiles even though the United States sold them to Iran, nor have they re-

ceived any mine-clearing equipment which could even now save tens of thousands of lives. Although Stinger missiles were a major success while supplies lasted, the resistance lacks even rudimentary maps and night optics, and has severe shortages of field communications equipment. The latter two items, far from being too technical or highly classified, could be bought from Radio Shack. Back at Langley, no consistent thought was ever given to military supplies.

In the midst of Afghanistan's chaos, several facts remain. First is that Najibullah's regime does not need to be included in any deal, nor should it be. He and his party participated in the slaughter of more than a million of their own countrymen; he and his party are the reason the refugees won't go home. Slipping the Kabul regime into a new deal is no less abhorrent than making DeGaulle share power after World War II with the Nazi collaborators in the Vichy regime.

Secondly, the seeming strength of the Kabul regime arises, mostly, from American and Pakistani blunders that deprived the mujaheddin of weapons. The war is no less a popular uprising than it ever was, and restoring the supply lines will bring more resistance troops into the field and increase pressure on the already besieged Kabul regime.

Fortunately a mechanism exists for supplying the resistance with the weapons it needs. This spring, ISI ordered the resistance parties to hold a convention in Islamabad and set up a government-in-exile in Peshawar. The interim government, composed of 500 Afghan commanders, politicians, scholars and religious leaders, refused to follow Pakistani orders; their finances were slashed.

State Department officials explained that the interim government's inactivity was due to ever-quabbling Afghans; the Afghans themselves complained that without money or weapons or agricultural supplies to distribute, there was nothing for the departments to do. U.S. officials responded that monies and weapons were being "phased in" to the interim government, but this was not true—no weapons and virtually no money were ever sent. The ISI prefers to give the supplies to the seven mujaheddin factions as well as chosen individual commanders, enhancing the opportunities for manipulation.

When Peter Thomsen, the U.S. envoy to the Afghan resistance, visited Peshawar in July, Yunis Khalis, leader of one fundamentalist mujaheddin group, made two requests: Give the mujaheddin realistic offensive weapons instead of guerrilla weapons, and hand over the weapons and finances to the interim government. Getting no response, Khalis threw down the gauntlet in late August, announcing he will turn over all his party's weapons, personnel, schools and hospitals to the interim government. He urged the other parties to follow suit, although his decision is not dependent on whether they join in.

Few of the remaining six leaders, especially Hekmatyar, are expected to be so public-spirited. But giving the supplies to the interim government could force the parties to go along. Party divisions mean less to the mujaheddin and their field commanders than they do to Peshawar-based politicians. Deciding

Pak policy on Afghanistan reflected in NAM document

BELGRADE—Pakistan Thursday scored a major victory at the 9th summit conference of the non-aligned countries by foiling attempts by Kabul regime to involve Non-Aligned Movement in the Afghan situation.

The Kabul delegation had put forward several proposals in the political committee for incorporation into the final document on Afghanistan which, among other things, suggested the holding of an international conference on Afghanistan with the participation of the neighbouring countries, the signatories to the Geneva accords and the chairman of the UNAM as its members.

They had also suggested convening of a special session of NAM coordinating bureau to meet in New York during the General Assembly session to discuss ways to promote a political settlement in Afghanistan.

Pakistan and other members of the committee opposed such parallel and independent initiatives outside the efforts already being made by the UN Secretary General, Mr. Perez de

Cuelar, under a mandate by the signatories to the Geneva accords to facilitate a political settlement in Afghanistan. This mandate, they pointed out, was reaffirmed last year by the consensus resolution adopted by the General Assembly on Afghanistan.

Accordingly, the document as adopted by the political committee does not reflect any of the Kabul regime proposals while it contains all the elements of Pakistan's policy on Afghanistan.

Welcoming the completion of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, it calls on all parties concerned to intensify their efforts for a political settlement on the basis of Geneva agreements.

It also draws attention to the need for the immediate opening of an intra-Afghan dialogue with a view establishing a broad-based government that would enjoy the widest support by all segments of the Afghan people.

It stresses the need for creating conditions for voluntary return of Afghan refugees with safety and honour and calls on international community to increase its humanitarian aid to Afghan

refugees to facilitate their repatriation and reintegration in Afghan society.

The document underlines the need for continued NAM support to the UN efforts for the settlement of the issue.

At Pakistan's instance a paragraph was added appreciating the efforts of the outgoing Chairman, Mr. Robert Mugabe and hoping that these would be continued by the current chairman and Yugoslavia President Dr. Janez Drnovsek.

A change was adopted in the preamble of the document on Afghanistan prefixing the word "Islamic" before the words "Republic of Afghanistan." This was done on a proposal by Iran which was supported by Pakistan. India was the only country expressing reservations which it withdrew when pointed out that such amendments had been made previously also. PT 9/8

US policy on Afghanistan unchanged: State Dept.

WASHINGTON — Declaring that the United States remained fully committed to supporting the Afghan Mujahideen, a State Department spokeswoman on Tuesday declined comments on reports about a change in the way U.S. weapons are supplied to the resistance.

"We do not discuss our arms policy towards Afghan resistance groups," spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler said while responding to questions at a news briefing.

Press reports over the weekend said that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has removed the head of its Afghan Task Force following Congressional criticism of the handling of the covert arms programme for the Afghan resistance since February's Soviet withdrawal.

These reports said that CIA director William Webster promised Congressional critics that the agency would do a better job getting arms to the Mujahideen who are suffering from an acute shortage.

"Our basic policy has not changed," she told reporters.

"As you know, we back a political solution for Afghanistan that ensures self-determination for the Afghan people, the establishment of a broad-based, representative government in Kabul, and the return of the refugees in safety and honour," the spokeswoman declared. "We remain fully committed in our support to the resistance." APP



The Soviet Union's highest-ranking officer in Afghanistan opposed the Kremlin's decision to send Soviet troops into that country in 1979—and lost his job because of it, the Moscow weekly Literary Gazette reported. In an interview, Gen. Ivan G. Pavlovsky, now 80, said he proposed that the Communist Party Politburo send a representative to Kabul to express then-Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev's fears that Afghan leader Hafizullah Amin would turn toward the United States. But Pavlovsky, commander of Soviet ad-

visers in Afghanistan, was overruled by Brezhnev with the unanimous backing of the Politburo, the weekly said, and was brought home and stripped of his Defense Ministry posts.

LAT

9/20

Jointly where the weapons should go could bring the resistance a combined command both in Peshawar and throughout most of Afghanistan. Hekmatyar would have to agree or else desert the resistance altogether.

What's required is a strong decision from the White House to back the Afghan interim government and to include the former king—regardless of which Washington staffers lose face. The CIA and ISI have had their turn running the Afghan war, and they have failed. It might be worthwhile giving the Afghans a chance to win it themselves.

The Washington Post

SEPTEMBER 10, 1989

Bill McCollum, a Republican congressman from Florida, is chairman of the GOP Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. Staff members contributed to this article.

Afghanistan's tribal chiefs struggle to reassert power

QUETTA — Abdul Khaliq recalled fleeing to the mountains 11 years ago when officials of Afghanistan's Communist Government killed 13 members of his family, all leaders of the most important tribe in Farah Province, on the border between Afghanistan and Iran.

Khaliq slaughtered his relatives, he said, because it wanted to usurp the power of traditional tribal chiefs. Since then, Khaliq has been a leading commander in the Afghan Jihad.

These days, with Soviet troops no longer in Afghanistan and his fellow mujahideen fighting themselves as much as the government, Khaliq is worried about the future.

To avoid collapsing into fratricidal civil war, he said, Afghanistan must return to its traditional leaders and social structures, which are largely tribal. Khaliq added any return to the old ways would entail a risky challenge of some Islamic fundamentalist guerrilla leaders who control guns and money channelled to the resistance from the West.

Of the seven main guerrilla parties based in Peshawar, four espouse militant Islamic ideologies that defy the old tribal way of organizing Afghan society. "These fundamentalist Islamic political parties are like to the Communists they don't like tribal people, they don't like chiefs," Khaliq said.

"But the importance of the tribal elders has become much greater since the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The traditional leaders are the only people who can solve the problems of society."

Tribal scions like Khaliq appear to represent an emerging force in the complex Afghan war, at odds with Kabul on one side and the fundamentalist parties on the other.

Since the mujahideen began fighting the pro-Soviet Government in Kabul 11 years ago, they have been divided between the four fundamentalist factions and three groups that are organised on more traditional tribal lines. But since the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the hostility between the two types of mujahideen has come into the open, according to resistance leaders and Western diplomats in Pakistan.

Before modern warfare ravaged Afghan society, tribal chieftains of the Pashtun ethnic group ruled with a strong hand from their bases in the country's

south and east. Now the influence of the tribes has been partly usurped by urban communists, Islamic intellectuals and non-tribal military commanders who have made their reputations on the battlefield.

With the Soviet troops gone, leaving the Afghans to settle things among themselves, the tribal leaders are reasserting claims to power. "There is now more need and respect for the tribal chiefs than ever," said Zia 'ojadidi, a former Kabul university professor who runs an informal information centre in this Pashtun tribal region. "With all the infighting and confusion now, you see more need for relationships of blood-cousins, brothers, sisters. They feel more secure within their own tribe."

A resurrection of tribal power in Afghanistan provokes fears among the fundamentalist mujahideen, who are ideologically opposed, and among members of groups who were oppressed under the old system.

For hundreds of years, the Afghan state, with its weak centre and strong regional leaders, was essentially a confederation of tribal families. The family alignments holding power in Kabul shifted because of marriage, murder and intrigue, but the tribes endured. Many mujahideen never enjoyed the privileges of tribal power and are unable to see the old families rise again.

Tribalism also raises thorny problems for the United States, and Saudi Arabia, which provide military and financial aid to the resistance.

The most immediate problem is the rivalry between tribal mujahideen and those loyal to the fundamentalist political parties led in Pakistan by religious intellectuals exiled from Kabul.

An example of how this growing rivalry has undermined mujahideen unity in recent months can be found in Kandahar, the historic home to some of Afghanistan's most important tribal families.

International relief workers and mujahideen officials involved in military operations in Kandahar, said there has been little fighting in the province lately — despite urging by the US for a major offensive — because of disputes between traditional leaders in the area and fundamentalist officials from other regions of Afghanistan.

Mujahideen officials and relief workers said that following the Soviet withdrawal, a province-wide military council, or Shura, was organised to unify operations in Kandahar. The Shura drew its strength from tribal families, and a locally respected elder, Haji Akhund, was elected as its chief. They said the Shura also included commanders from all seven mujahideen political parties.

But when party leaders ordered the council to mount an attack on Kandahar city, Akhund's council balked, saying that capturing Kandahar by force was impossible and would result in too many civilian deaths — civilians who were in some cases members of the same tribal families represented on the council.

The mujahideen have long complained of corruption and selfishness by tribal leaders, and some attributed Akhund's pacifism not to tribal humanitarianism, but to his desire to attract international aid money and patronage.

"The intention of the Shura was to act against the interest of the mujahideen and to attract material and international relief dollars for themselves in the name of Kandahar," charged Mullah Malang, one of the best-known military commanders in south-eastern Afghanistan.

Malang, a minor religious leader who vaulted to prominence in Kandahar because of his fighting prowess, is typical of those who are suspicious of the old tribal elders as an elixir for Afghan society.

"During 10 or 11 years of fighting, things have changed," he said. "Before, there was a tribe and one big chief. Now the tribe has disintegrated into 10 or 15 pieces, and the leaders are not so important as they used to be."

Still, Malang argued that a resurrection of tribal chiefs would make a big difference to the war effort if they "preached and worked to bring the people closer."

Olivier Roy, a French scholar whose book, "Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan," has guided US policy-makers analysing sociological aspects of the Afghan war, argued that tribal claims to power were no longer tenable in Afghanistan because religious intellectuals and political leaders had spread a unifying and modernising Islamic ideology that had overtaken old loyalties.

Some Afghans in this tribal region question that analysis.

They say Roy may have been right earlier in the war, when the fundamentalist parties were especially strong and made impressive gains fighting the Soviets. But now, these Afghans say, the religious parties are battling each other while the tribal leaders are reasserting themselves.

Since February, the Kabul Government has stepped up its sporadic campaign to woo tribal leaders to its side. Guerrilla officials here report that some informal talks have taken place between certain tribes and the Afghan Government, but they say there is little chance that Kabul will win public allegiance.

"Kabul understood they made a mistake in killing the tribal leaders," said Khaliq. "Now they have a big campaign for the elders. They'll give them any post in the administration, with full compensation for the deaths in their families, but people won't take it."

One major, unanswered question about Afghanistan after so many years of war is whether, given the chance to vote in a free election, most Afghans would express support for their traditional chiefs and elders or back the conservative Islamic intellectuals who run the major mujahideen political parties.

There has been no scientific polling on this question, and both the tribes and the fundamentalists claim to have won the loyalty of the masses.

"The importance of these (traditional) leaders and tribal people will be seen by all the world when there are elections," Khaliq said, laughing confidently.

MIDIA: official news agency of Afghan interim govt.

PESHAWAR — The President of Islamic interim government of Afghanistan, Prof. Sibghatullah Mujaddidi Sunday inaugurated the newly formed official news agency of his government "Media Information Department of Islamic Afghanistan (MIDIA)".

In brief remarks on the occasion, Prof. Mujaddidi spoke about the necessity of formation of official news agency of the Islamic interim government of Afghanistan which he said would properly project the cause of Mujahideen and the successes they were making on the warfronts inside Afghanistan.

He said after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Mujahideen had no effective means to inform the world about real situation in the warfronts.

He expressed the hope that MIDIA would serve the Afghan people in a befitting manner by projecting their cause effectively.

The Information Minister of the Islamic interim government of Afghanistan, Dr. Najeebulah Lafraie said Mujahideen's victory against Soviet Union in Afghanistan was not projected properly. —APP.

Afghan issue puts Khyber Agency under tension

PESHAWAR — The tribal area of Khyber Agency on Pak-Afghan border is in grip of fastly-developing tension over continued closure of vital Torkham-Jalalabad Highway linking Pakistan with Afghanistan.

This important trade route which has been under control of Afghan Mujahideen has almost ruined flourishing business of smuggled goods in the tribal territory rendering businessmen bankrupt, and also leading to closure of foreign goods and markets particularly in the tribal belt. Besides depriving hundreds of tribesmen from their livelihood being earned through sale and purchase of a variety of smuggled goods.

Reports said if the Highway was not opened by Afghan Mujahideen in coming few weeks, the situation in Khyber Agency will assume a dangerous turn and videotapes armed clashes between tribesmen and Mujahideen could not be ruled out.

The tribesmen mostly depend on this route which is a lifeline for their thriving trade business both in tribal and settled areas.

The acute shortage of foreign goods is being badly felt in Bara markets not only in the NWFP but in various parts of Punjab as well, due to closure of Torkham-Jalalabad Highway and business has come to standstill for local shopkeepers selling these goods manufactured and imported from abroad.

Several meeting and jirgas were being held at Landi Kotal, Jamrud and Bara etc.

With special emphasis for an armed intervention by the inhabitants to leave the highway open by pushing aside armed Afghan Mujahideen currently manning the route.

A delegation of tribal traders on Sunday met in Peshawar with President of Afghan Mujahideen interim government. Prof. Sibghatullah Mojaddadi to

apprise him of the situation and the difficulty being faced by tribesmen for the last few months following blockade of the road by certain resistance groups in the aftermath of intensification of battle for Jalalabad.

Prof. Mojaddadi assured the tribal delegation of positive response in removing their grievances after consultation with his other colleagues in the resistance.

Tribesmen particularly those dealing with the business of imported goods are openly expressing their growing hatred over the whole situation leading to ruination of their trade both in the tribal territory and famous Bara markets in and around Peshawar.

In the wake of Mujahideen's persistent control and capture over important road-links, the Russian-made cycles, cloth, various kinds of jams from Socialist bloc, electric equipments of different kinds and host of other articles and items of daily use have vanished from markets or in some cases were being sold at highly exorbitant rates out of reach of the common man. —PPI.

The Pakistan Times

8/21

solution

UNITED NATIONS — The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar, stated here Tuesday that the problem relating to Afghanistan can only be solved "by political means."

Reporting on the work of the UN organisation, the Secretary-General noted that renewed fighting in Afghanistan has severely impeded the United Nations' effort in rendering humanitarian assistance of the Afghan people.

The report, submitted annually by the UN chief to the General Assembly, is a comprehensive review of world developments as they relate to the United Nations.

On the situation in Afghanistan, he pointed out that despite the signing of the Geneva Accords and the adoption of Assembly resolution, "the suffering of the people of Afghanistan has not yet been brought to an end."

Calling the total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan "a major step towards a peaceful settlement," he however, specifically mentioned the fact that the fighting between the Kabul government forces and the Mujahideen has escalated "with massive infusion of war material."

The UN chief called for a consensus needed both at the international and the national levels for a political solution.

While such a consensus has not yet emerged, efforts are under way to narrow the gulf between the positions by the countries neighbouring Afghanistan and other concerned countries.

He noted "a fundamental need" for a structure through which the wishes of the various segments of the Afghan people can be validly expressed. He did not elaborate what kind of structure he has in mind.

He vowed to persevere in his efforts to pursue the mandate entrusted to him by the General Assembly to help find a political solution to the Afghan problem. — PT 9/14

Frontier trader laments the fortunes of war

Kathy Evans

IT WAS not much of a branch for such an illustrious retail group as Marks and Spencer. But Aftab Khan's corner shop in Hayatabad bazaar outside the city of Peshawar contained the genuine stuff.

Neat rows of Marks and Sparks socks, brass, a selection of Harris tweed jackets were on sale at prices not much above those in London.

Aftab Khan is in a rebellious mood, and such moods among the businessmen of the tribal areas where government law does not prevail can often prove fatal to someone. Mr. Khan is angry because the Afghan war, after 10 years, has finally stopped his business.

The traditional route to and from Afghanistan has been closed for the past five months because of the Mujahidin fighting around Jalalabad. The city lies astride the main road from the border post of Torkham on the Khyber Pass to the Afghan capital of Kabul.

Although the Mujahidin failed to capture Jalalabad last March, continued shelling is preventing the daily flow of trucks.

The trade is two way — both in and out of Afghanistan — but the tribal businessmen are a vital lifeline for Kabul, supplying fresh vegetables, fruit and items to make life in the besieged capital

bearable. In recent years, the traffic coming out of Afghanistan has surprisingly, far outranked the volume going in. Strict regulations on the import of luxury items and high costs in Karachi port make the Afghan route much easier, say tribal businessmen. Elaborate trade links with Europe and Japan via the Soviet Union and Afghanistan have been established. Inhabitants of the tribal agencies are by tradition allowed to cross the Afghan border unimpeded.

Tribal and family affiliations ignore such niceties as nationality and passports. Throughout the height of the Afghan war against the Soviet army, Khyber businessmen travelled regularly to Kabul.

Foreign exchange was easily available on the city's black market. The goods arrived in Afghanistan via the Soviet Union in the north, and travelled to the east where they crossed semi-illegally into Pakistan.

The wartime trade bought an influx of such items as western electronics, porcelain from China, cloth from Europe — and Marks and Spencers socks. It also generated an unexpected bonus for Soviet export organisations. Anything and everything came in

— from Soviet paper clips to Soviet fridges and televisions.

Now the tap has been turned off and the tribal businessmen say they have lost hundreds of millions of dollars because the road to Kabul has been closed by the Mujahidin.

Mr. Khalil Khan, president of the Tribal Businessmen's Association, and his associates are threatening to stop Mujahidin arms traffic along the Torkham road if the Mujahidin continue to stop their trucks. Almost every home in the tribal agencies has a gun, if not two.

Weaponry in the tribal areas far exceeds that available to the local police force, the Khyber Rifles, whose job it is to control the road to Torkham.

Things went from bad to worse earlier this month when another route was tried through Terimangal, a deserted village on the border with Pakhtia province. Traders complain that the tolls exacted by Mujahidin parties are now so high as to make the route unviable. Trucks have been looted.

The provincial government is trying to keep its head down. A senior official said that whatever went on in Afghanistan was nothing to do with Pakistan, a claim which is somewhat hard to swallow when Pakistan hosts the Mujahidin government on its soil. — PT-Guardian Service.

The Pakistan Times 8/29



■ Mr. Perez de Cuellar ...

U.S. motives behind direct aid to Afghan commanders

Nawab Saleem

The U.S. interest in the past decade or so in Afghanistan was tied up to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. This was amply proved by the drastic change in the U.S. Afghan policy after the departure of the Red Army from Afghanistan.

The attitude of successive U.S. administrations towards Afghanistan in the past half a century has been one of resignation to accepting this country in the orbit of Soviet influence. The pre-stoat reaction of President Jimmy Carter to the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR was that, "The U.S. will not tolerate further Russian advance in south and south-west Asia." This clearly meant that the U.S. did not care in the least about the occupation of a country by the rival superpower which was anyway in their view in the orbit of Soviet interests.

Richard Nixon, as vice president of the USA under President Eisenhower, visited Afghanistan in the mid-fifties. After a 3-day official fact-finding mission he reported to his government that it was out of the question to get Afghanistan extricated from the Soviet influence and, therefore, there was no point in helping Afghanistan economically. When Richard Nixon himself became president in the seventies he dispatched Spiro Agnew, his vice president, to Zahir Shah to ascertain the scope of American assistance to Afghanistan and later on in 1975 he dispatched Henry Kissinger, the U.S. secretary of state, to Sardar Daoud who had toppled Zahir Shah in 1973 and had taken the rein of power of the state of Afghanistan. Both of these two American figures had reported almost the same advice to their administration, that helping Afghanistan was not only a waste of time and resources but it would unduly antagonise the USSR and consequently prove detrimental to the process of detente initiated by Nixon and Brezhnev. Kissinger instead had advised Daoud to seek the assistance of the Shah of Iran and other rich Gulf states.

Daoud Khan, who had been installed in the saddle of power by the Kremlin rulers, did make a volte-face in his last two years in office and turned to the Shah of Iran and other Gulf states for economic assistance. He managed to strike deals of billions of dollars

with the mentioned countries which caused alarm in Moscow. The USSR, like any other imperialist power, wanted political clout for the economic aid it was providing to the Kabul government. Daoud was summoned to Moscow and Brezhnev minced no words in telling him that the shift in policy of Afghanistan in favour of America was considered an act of hostility towards the USSR. Brezhnev really meant what he said. When Daoud did not behave, they colluded in his bloody overthrow in 1973. Daoud's inauspicious volte-face resulted in a revolt that cost him his life and power.

On the other hand, the Russians have been getting more and more entrenched in the political and economic life of Afghanistan over the past 50 years. Half a century of economic penetration resulted in the direct political manipulation of Afghan politics. This manipulation went so far as to overthrow the Daoud regime at the hands of those who were "russified" deliberately by Zahir Shah and Daoud.

Zahir Shah must have realised by now that he was mistaken when he advised his ministers that the red flags were not menacing and what was ominous were the green flags. He thought those who were his pupils (Tarakai and Karmal) would be innocuous, at least to him as their mentor; but he forgot that he was dealing with the Russians. Zahir Shah was so smug that he even did not read the maxim scribbled for him on the wall by Abdur Rehman Khan. Abdur Rahman, a despotic king of Afghanistan who had spent 18 years in Russia in exile, had once said about his experience with the Russians, "You have better place an axe beneath your head if you happen to rest in the same room, even with your Russian father."

Anyhow, it was America's abandoning Afghanistan to the Russians' mercy and the treason and impolices of Zahir Shah and Daoud, that enabled the USSR to devour Afghanistan politically and militarily.

There were rumours soon after the invasion that Brezhnev had intimated Jimmy Carter about the march-in of the Red Army two weeks before he ordered the Red Army across the Oxus river. There were also reports in the American and Western press that the U.S. satellites had observed concentration of Soviet forces along Russo-Afghan borders. But still the Americans did not inform the

world about the forthcoming invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR until after the Red Army crossed into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979.

The reason the U.S. has recently altered its Afghan policy is because, after the departure of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the erstwhile congruity of aims and policies vis-a-vis Islam was revived. The only common point in the global designs of the superpowers has always been crushing Islamic movements which are perceived as shared danger to their interests around the world.

To manifest this congruity of purpose, especially in the context of the Afghan issue, the U.S. had to take measures to prove to the USSR that it was doing its share of responsibility (weakening the fundamentalists by hook or by crook). In return, they expect the Soviets to do something about the Najib regime and thus pave the way for the mutually acceptable alternative.

It is in quest for this alternative that Gorbachev sends Vorontsov, and Bush a senior American diplomat, to Rome to persuade the king to resume his former role of suffocating Islam and promoting secularism in Afghanistan.

Another U.S. measure that points to its adherence to the policy of quest for a third alternative is that the USA openly does not want a military victory for the mujahideen. They (Americans) are dead against success of the phenomenon of jihad in the world.

They are afraid that it might be emulated elsewhere in the world and as a result their fear of the resurgence and dominance of Islam will come true. In order to give a signal of their sincerity to the Soviets in this regard, they cut off their military aid to the mujahideen at the crucial Jalalabad battle. The ensuing shortage of ammunition resulted in the conkingout of the Jalalabad operations, which badly tarnished the image of the mujahideen and put to question their ability to seize and hold big cities.

The third studied step the U.S. has taken in this regard is that it neither recognised the AIG nor allowed others to do so. The only reason the U.S. professes lip-service support to the AIG is because it thinks that under the garb of the AIG, it will strengthen those parties which are pro-American and will weaken the rest.

The fourth step the USA is wil-

ling to take is to supply weapons directly to those commanders whom the U.S. thinks are pliant and will toe the American line.

As a *quid pro quo* to the mentioned American measures, the Soviets are continuously assuring USA that they will sacrifice the Najib regime at the altar of this covert understanding against Islam.

The motives that made the U.S. take the step of giving aid directly to the commanders of the resistance are as follows:

a) Weakening the fundamentalist parties by weaning off the commanders from such parties. From scratch, the USA was trying to create equally balanced parties of the resistance as they thought Hezb-e-Islami, which had initiated the jihad, was not toeing the line and, therefore, it should not have been allowed to lead the resistance alone.

b) To buy off commanders whom, according to the American experts, will be the future "rulers" of Afghanistan. The U.S. appointed a special envoy to the resistance to facilitate this aim of the U.S. administration to bypass the political parties of the mujahideen and deal directly with the commanders. The U.S. unfortunately thought that all the commanders of the mujahideen would be as weak and self-sold as the paper lions they have made in some parts of Afghanistan.

c) To enable the Americans to collect some of the weapons they do not want to remain in mujahideen possession at any particular juncture. For instance, the American efforts to collect the Stingers from the mujahideen miserably failed.

d) To weaken the parties of mujahideen who are viewed to be hindering American influence, which is supposed to be exercised in return for the aid.

e) To take the rein of the resistance in their own hands i.e. to continue the resistance as long as the West can extract concessions from the Russians and to stop it at any time at will.

f) To evince to the Russians that the real power of decision-making of the resistance is in their hands and not in the hands of some parties with whom the Soviets might prefer to strike a deal for the solution of the problem. This fact could be seen and felt when mujahideen were holding talks with the Soviets to the chagrin of America.

g) To preclude the possibility of the solution of the issue on regio-

nal or bilateral bases between the mujahideen and the Soviets. In either case, U.S. will not be a party to the solution of the issue.

b) Bypassing the Pakistan Army which is also viewed as fundamentalist and a natural friend of the fundamentalist mujahideen parties:

i) To show that the *jihad* was not an Islamic one but was a Russo-American war and thus defame the very concept of *jihad*.

j) Thwarting mujahideen efforts for holding elections and paving the way for Loya Jirga. Since depoliticisation of the commanders' will certainly give the resi-

stance a tribal tinge, thus the way will be paved for Loya Jirga. The Americans are oblivious to the fact that by taking such measures they are getting themselves physically involved in Afghanistan. In the view of all Afghans, this will be tantamount to intervention by a foreign power in the affairs of Afghanistan. While common sense dictates that all countries of the world must have drawn a lesson from the Soviet and British interventions in Afghanistan, we are at a loss to know why America is not reading the writing on the wall.

Frontier Post 9/30

Afghan guerrillas who feel forgotten

WASHINGTON: Afghan guerrillas, disappointed that United States-supplied munitions dwindled after Soviet forces left their country, wonder if Americans have lost interest in backing them to victory in their freedom struggle, according to a guerrilla commander.

Brigadier Rahmatullah

Safi said: "I am sorry to say some kind of mistrust has arisen."

He said the feeling now among the guerrillas is that "Americans are very good people, but they leave you in the middle of the road... instead of showing friendship to the end".

"The end of the road" for the guerrillas and several million Afghan refugees in neighbouring countries will be victory in the form of a legal Muslim government acceptable to the people of Afghanistan to replace President Najibullah's communists ruling in Kabul, he said.

Interruption of US ammunition and weapons supplies as the Soviets beefed up the Kremlin-installed Afghan Government in Kabul caused military setbacks and loss of confidence, he said.

But "at the moment there is no problem in the supply... we are satisfied with the continuation," said Brigadier Safi, visiting Washington for talks with US officials.

He is head of intelligence for the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan.

SCMP 9/18

Warlords in Afghanistan wield benevolent might

By Howard Witt
Chicago Tribune

PUL-I-KHUMRI, Afghanistan — About the only difference between the Naderi warlords who ruled over Afghanistan 14 centuries ago and the men who rule Baghlan province today is that the current governor once cooked french fries at McDonald's and likes to drive around in a new fire-engine-red Mercedes sedan.

Everything else — the political and military autonomy enjoyed by the leaders, the absolute devotion paid them by the peasant subjects, even the animal sacrifices made in their honor in every remote village — is essentially unchanged from the time of the birth of Muhammad, founder of the Islamic religion that took deep root in Afghanistan.

Two wealthy men, a father and his son, rule this northern province, a forbidding and primitive region not far from the Soviet border that is equal parts parched desert and rugged mountains.

The much-beloved father, a king in all but title, is Mansoor Naderi, 53, the religious leader of a minor Islamic sect in Afghanistan, the Ismailis.

His 25-year-old son, Jaffer, a man who could easily be mistaken for the late American comedian John Belushi, holds the secular offices of provincial governor, army general and commander of the 80th Division of the Afghan government forces.

* * *

Baghlan is a living picture of how Afghanistan might sort out its tangled future by resurrecting its feudal past.

Jaffer, an informal and gregarious man who prefers to be called by his first name, also has two motorcycles he would like to exchange for a "dirt bike" if only he could find one in Afghanistan, and he has a hankering to learn to fly helicopters.

All of this he explained in quite creditable English, a legacy of the four years he spent at a high school in Allentown, Pa., from 1977 to 1981.

He was in the United States for his safety, he said. His father was jailed

during the first two years after the 1978 communist revolution in Afghanistan. The early leaders of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan deemed his father a potential threat because of his influence as a spiritual leader.

By the time he returned home in 1981, Jaffer had become so Americanized that he had forgotten how to speak the native Persian of his countrymen. He had to take special language classes to refresh his memory.

Soon he joined the government army, he said, spending 3½ years in battle against the U.S.-supported Islamic fundamentalist mujahideen guerrillas. He said he earned a medal for "general bravery."

Last year, President Najib made Jaffer a general with a division of 15,000 men, as well as governor of Baghlan province. He is the youngest man in the country to hold such posts.

Fast food, fast cars, fast living. It would be hard to imagine a more unlikely governor of a province where peasant farmers still plow behind teams of oxen; where every brown mud house bears the palm prints of the men who built it one sloppy handful at a time; where there are so few bridges across the rivers and streams that people ford them by tucking hollowed pumpkins under their arms and floating across; where life is so hard and disease is so rampant that a person of 50 is considered very old.

But Jaffer is not a general and a governor because he was necessarily the most appropriate man for those jobs. He holds those titles because, in the naked power politics of modern day Afghanistan, the government needs his father as an ally. *

Every time Naderi's white vehicle approached a village, the residents rushed from their homes and roads to line the road. A cow or a goat was hastily slaughtered so that Naderi's tires might pass over the blood and sanctify the settlement.

The people crossed their arms over their chests, bowed forward toward the waist and reached out to try to touch Naderi's outstretched hand. These desperately poor people threw money at Naderi's car, a gesture that

he invariably insisted they stop. Such devotion was so frequent and so spontaneous that it could not possibly have been staged for reporters. Rather, it appeared to reflect the genuine respect and awe in which Naderi, a man who claims religious leadership of more than one million Afghans, is held by the people, Islamists and non-Islamists alike.

Much of that respect arises from Naderi's benevolence. A bear of a man slowed by heart problems, Naderi has built hospitals, schools, houses and roads where there were none. He pays medicines for people who can't afford them. He hands out money and food to those in need. As his people who is most important to them, Naderi or President Najib, and the response will be a polite smile at the stupidity of the question.

Ask them what will happen to them when Naderi dies, and the looks freeze into fear.

For what Naderi has given his people above all is security in a country where mujahideen rockets fall randomly from the sky and government attack helicopters swoop low over rooftops. He offers people displaced from other war zones a safe haven. They need only agree to help defend the areas where they settle if they are attacked by the mujaheddin.

Naderi is not particularly forthcoming about why he decided to support a regime that jailed him. He says only that he believes Najib is more tolerant of religious diversity than the earlier communist leaders, and that the president "truly wants to reconcile the country."

Three years ago, Naderi agreed to help defend Baghlan province for the government in exchange for weapons and the control of the economy in his region. A main part of his responsibility is patrolling a portion of the Salana road connecting the capital, Kabul, to the Soviet Union.

Naderi is obviously a useful man to the Kabul government. But he minces no words when asked what might happen if President Najib asked him to do something he did not want to do.

"If I'm one of Najib's rules, I will simply reject it," he said.

Whether such assertiveness wor-

rries Najib is hard to discern, just as the government's real motives in ceding control of Baghlan province to this father and son are far from clear.

The arrangement could be exactly what the government insists it is a straightforward, pragmatic acknowledgment that this backward, Balkanized, tribal-dominated country will never be governed by a strong central government, that any ruling party will have to build coalitions with the many squabbling feudal chieftains who continue to exercise the real power in much of Afghanistan.

But parcelling out central government authority to powerful local warlords is a decidedly pro-communist thing to do, especially for a president who claims to uphold the 1978 revolution that was supposed to have destroyed Afghanistan's monarchy and the privileges of the elite.

So there is some evidence for a more cynical reading of what is happening in Baghlan province. The government may yet believe it can kick the rug from under Naderi and his son whenever it wishes.

"The people of Baghlan may not think they are ruled by the government right now," a senior government official in Kabul said ominously. "But when the time comes to explain it to them, we will be able to do it."

Philadelphia Inquirer

9/3

'Hired Guns' Help Afghan Regime Maintain Power

By MARK FINEMAN, Times Staff Writer

October 1, 1989

HERAT, Afghanistan—At 13, Abdul Rasik has already killed his first man.

He cannot even grow a beard, but the government of Afghan President Najibullah has entrusted him with an AK-47 assault rifle—and the responsibility of helping to protect this key city on Afghanistan's western flank, just a few dozen miles from both the Iranian and Soviet borders.

But Rasik doesn't really know what he is fighting for. He has never been to school. He has never even been to the Afghan capital of Kabul. And he knows little about the man who armed him or his policies.

Rasik and the other 250 boys in his "kiddie militia" answer only to their local commander, just like the tens of thousands of other tribal militiamen Najibullah has put on salary as "hired guns" in this ancient city and in other key regions throughout war-torn Afghanistan.

Yet it is largely through such civilian militias, many of them made up of former *mujahedeen* rebels, that Najibullah and his beleaguered Soviet-backed regime have desperately clung to power for the last seven months, since the Feb. 15 Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.

And it is through such militias, which are now so heavily armed and well paid that their arsenal includes tanks and artillery, that Najibullah claims to be regaining control of the Afghan countryside, where the rebels have long dominated.

But it remains unclear just who is controlling whom.

In Herat, the militias keep a semblance of order by day but later explode in a nightly display of prime-time violence, filling the evening air with a cacophony of rocket, grenade, mortar and machine gun fire as they clash with each other along ancient feudal and clan lines until bedtime.


And in Kabul, the government last week was powerless either to stop or to punish a visiting tribal commander from the province of Faryab, which borders the Soviet Union, after he attacked and terrorized three visiting foreign journalists inside a government hotel for more than three hours, during which the police and army were too frightened to intervene.

In short, half a year after the last of the Red Army left Afghanistan, ending a decade of intervention, the Afghan war is rapidly degenerating into loosely controlled chaos—a factional, Lebanon-style in-

terial conflict in which ancient tribal and clan feuds have replaced the original ideological clash between communism and fundamentalist Islam.

"Afghanistan just went back 50 years before the so-called Communist revolution ever happened," one European diplomat in Kabul said, referring to the decade-old uprising that brought Najibullah's ruling People's Democratic Party to power.

"Najib has survived mostly because he has abandoned most of the



Los Angeles Times

principles of that revolution and returned to the old tribal ways. Just one problem: Now, they've all got tanks."

Although most of Najibullah's advisers reject the Lebanon analogy, most conceded during a week of interviews with The Times that the government's policy of arming the militia is sowing the seeds of potential disaster.

"I agree that the mere presence of all these weapons is very dangerous for our future," said Suliman Leik, minister for tribal affairs in Najibullah's Cabinet. Leik is a hard-line Marxist who was so committed to the original revolution that he wrote the country's Communist-inspired national anthem. "Obviously there are some feuds, some points of contradiction. And before they were solved with fists. Now they will solve them with machine guns and tanks."

"It is certainly one of the challenges that we must overcome in the future."

In many ways, war-torn Herat, a patchwork of often-competing yet heavily armed private armies such as the "kiddie militia" of teen-age Rasik, is a stage for the darker side of that future Afghanistan.

The city's Birk Abad neighborhood is a dramatic backdrop. More than 14,000 homes were destroyed there by Soviet bombers in 1980 when Moscow used its military power to put down Herat's popular uprising against the Soviet inva-

sion in 1979.

"Roughly, we estimate it will cost \$2.5 billion to reconstruct the city and the province," said Herat's governor, Faizul Haq Khalilay, who also serves as a minister in Najibullah's Cabinet.

But very little of the tens of millions of dollars worth of bilateral aid that the Soviet Union has poured into Herat province has gone used for reconstruction.

The city streets are pitted with gaping potholes from 10 harsh winters and endless tank traffic. The bullet-pocked markets are filled with food, but at almost unaffordable prices. Few children attend the city's damaged schools. And the only money spent on physical reconstruction has gone into Herat's famous, 1,500-year-old Persian-style mosque, an attempt by Najibullah to regain the loyalties of the U.S.-backed *mujahedeen* who continue their guerrilla war against his government.

Even the local officials said that most of the Soviet aid to Herat has been spent on guns and food, which, in turn, have been used by the government to recruit tribal armies, buy clan loyalties and raise revenue to pay government salaries.

"In Herat, you can see how Najibullah's government is hanging on," said a foreign observer in Kabul. "Food and guns buy support, but it is part-time support. And his control is just a veneer."

"Just beneath the surface, it is a mini-Beruit, and if the Americans had the money and logistics to offer more, these tribal militias and clans would join the *mujahedeen* tomorrow."

The tribal commander who went berserk Tuesday night in the state-owned Kabul Hotel was a stark illustration of the government's limited control over the vast "civilian army" Najibullah has attempted to assemble.

In addition, the incident reinforced the fears of independent analysts that, despite a continuing state of national emergency, the government now has only a marginal ability to provide effective security in the Afghan capital, which most Western embassies left within weeks of the Soviet pullout.

But the attack by the drunken commander also revealed much about the complexities of Afghanistan's militarist tribal culture, which has mystified both the Soviet Union and the *mujahedeen*'s American benefactors throughout the war. Those traditions now appear to have overpowered even the 1979 Marxist revolution that sparked Afghanistan's war.

When Habibullah Beg attacked the three foreign journalists—among them The Times' correspondent—there was no force in Kabul willing or able to stop him.

Beg, a khan, or major tribal chief, later explained that he controls a heavily armed tribal army of 3,500 in Faryab province. To his men, he is not a commander but a ruler.

When he sided with the *mujahedeen* for much of the war, they followed. And when Beg "turned coat" earlier this year with the promise of massive supplies of arms and ammunition from the government, his men again blindly followed.

Drunken Spree

On Tuesday, Beg and a dozen of his lieutenants checked into the Kabul Hotel with machine guns and ammunition belts as the personal guests of President Najibullah, who had summoned all of his new tribal commanders from the northern regions to discuss preparations for the hard Afghan winter ahead.

But, that night, Beg, the great khan from the north, got hopelessly drunk.

"The man was in psychological shock," a Foreign Ministry spokesman explained during a press conference the following day. "He has watched his two brothers and mother shot to death. That day, he saw a man who resembled his brother, and he lost his mind."

"He went to his room, started drinking very heavily, and, well, we are very sorry about what happened."

Drunk and crazed, Beg slapped around one journalist, beat a second severely and chased both of them to the room of the third, where he broke down the door, stole everything in his path and continued to pursue the reporters for three hours through every corner of the hotel.

When the beatings began, the few guards at the hotel simply fled. The police, when informed that the khan was involved, delayed for several hours in responding to plead for help. And, when they finally did come to the journalists' rescue, they refused to file charges or even take down an official report on the attack.

Instead, the khan prepared a feast for the following night.

The government apologized profusely and appealed to the three journalists to attend the khan's "ceremony of apology," a feast "to free this tortured man from the sin he has committed against you."

The journalists agreed, and, for nearly two hours, over slaughtered lamb and chickens, watched the khan again get hopelessly drunk while offering scores of apologies and the occasional insult.

The government filmed the ceremony, complete with the khan's handing over of gifts—an Afghan rug and box of candy. An aide then carried the khan to his room, where his doctor injected him with strong sedatives.

"You will be safe tonight," the doctor told the journalists. "He's out cold."

At lunch the day after the feast of apology, with a full bottle of imported whiskey in front of him, the khan pointed toward the foreign journalists and asked the government official beside him, "What are those people still doing in my hotel?"



(See 10/24, p. 10)

Dan Rather aired fake battles with the Soviets

By JANET WILSON

The CBS Evening News with Dan Rather aired faked battle footage and false news accounts of the war in Afghanistan on at least four occasions in the mid-1980s, military and media sources in the United States, Europe and Asia have told The Post.

Most of the footage was shot by cameraman Mike Hoover, the sources said, and portions of it were used in a 1984 series that was narrated by Rather himself and later won the network a coveted DuPont Silver Baton award.

An Afghan rebel who was Hoover's cameraman during the award-winning project told The Post that the footage, which shows guerrillas exploding bombs and action-packed commando scenes, was entirely fake.

The rebel's allegation was backed by an Afghan-British journalist who was serving as Hoover's second cameraman on another project in Afghanistan and said he was well aware of Hoover's methods.

The 1984 series was just one of many stagings by Hoover, a man in his mid-40s, who acted more like a movie director than a journalist, according to sources.

Acting on initial information provided by a European journalist, The Post interviewed dozens of people on three continents by telephone during the last three weeks. The investigation comes as the broadcast news industry wrestles with controversy over the use of dramatic re-enactments of events.

The Post investigation produced these allegations about CBS' coverage of the war, which began with the invasion by Soviet troops in 1979:

■ A defense consultant who has written for the world-renowned Jane's military aviation guides said Hoover took pictures of a Pakistani jet practicing flying, and presented it as a Soviet jet bombing Afghan villages in 1986.

■ A Boston University professor claimed that, in 1987, CBS credited Hoover footage stolen from one of his students, and then grossly misreported what was in the footage.

Rather, managing editor and anchorman of the CBS Evening News, has pushed coverage of the Afghan war since his first trip there in 1980. Rather was not in Afghanistan when Hoover did his work. No one from CBS, including Rather, would comment on whether he or other



Rather reporting the Afghan war

CBS personnel believe they were misled by the cameraman.

Sources inside CBS said there was serious concern over the charge, but uncertainty about how to investigate. "It's hard to question Afghan rebels," said one.

A woman who identified herself as Beverly Johnson, and claimed she was Hoover's wife, said the cameraman was working in remote caves in New Zealand and could not be contacted.

On Nov. 12 and 13, 1984, the CBS Evening News aired segments called "Operation Black-out." Rather told viewers that Hoover had been on hand for the "largest sabotage operation of the war," and aired video of what was said to be mujahadeen rebels blowing up live electric towers or pylons, to cut electricity in the Afghan capital of Kabul.

Power had actually been cut off 12 days before Hoover arrived. The Post was told.

"He was late," said Afghan-British journalist Habib Kawayani, who said he remembers Hoover's rushing through the Pakistani border town of Peshawar toward Afghanistan after the blackout.

Hoover caught up with a returning group of mujahadeen rebels of the National Islamic Front for Afghanistan (NIFA), sources said. Hoover persuaded the leaders to order their men back to the scene, said Etabari, the rebel who acted as Hoover's translator. Etabari uses only one name, as do many Afghans. The Post interviewed him by phone in Peshawar, Pakistan, where he now lives. He said he has since left the rebel group.

"Mike Hoover knew the pylons were already destroyed. I told him everything was finished. He already knew," said Etabari. After having reached the safety of the Pakistan border, Etabari and a dozen other rebels were ordered to turn around and make the arduous march back through the steep Kush mountains to the original site where many pylons had earlier been toppled. Once there, Hoover was told the mujahadeen to destroy pylons that were already destroyed. It was completely wrong. It was just for the movie."

Etabari said he had grave misgivings about what Hoover was doing, but said he went on orders of his leader, Rahim Wardak, who appeared frequently in the award-winning

CBS News segments.

Etabari claims he viewed the staging of scenes purporting to show rebels stalking supposed government guards and blowing up a mine, acted out in the safety of a Pakistani military training camp. In another instance, adds Etabari, video claiming to depict the evacuation of 4,000 people from their homes near Kabul actually was taped many miles away at the Pakistani-Afghan border.

"Four thousand men, women and children, entire villages, are on the move, driven into exile by fear of Soviet retaliation," Rather narrated over murky night footage of a single line of people walking.

"Mike Hoover, the cameraman who took these photographs, said it was the only time he saw the mujahadeen cry," Rather added as viewers saw a misty-eyed Afghan fighter, and heard the sounds of moaning.

Said Kawayani: "The villages were empty long before."

Kawayani said he has hiked the Afghan mountains for nine years, covering the war for BBC and other news organizations. In 1982, he said, he hiked through the area Hoover supposedly filmed in 1984, and saw the villagers streaming from their homes.

Kawayani also worked with Hoover on a 1986 expedition as an assistant cameraman, and said he was appalled at the way Hoover ordered the mujahadeen around and arranged specific scenes. He left Hoover after a disagreement, Kawayani said. He added that he was never paid for the trip.

Following are details of other possible violations of journalistic practices attributed to Hoover:

■ At the end of 1987, CBS broadcast an hour-long special assembled by Hoover. He allegedly edited in shots of a Pakistani plane on a training flight and made it appear to be a Soviet jet bombing Afghan villages according to a military aviation expert.

After screening the segment, David Iaby, a government defense consultant in Afghanistan and Washington and a contributing author of Jane's aviation guides, the most respected military aviation guides in the world, said:

"That is not a Soviet jet. That is a Chinese-made Q-5 Fanfan, used by the Pakistani Air Force. You frequently see them in Peshawar, low-flying over refugee camps near the airport. I would accuse him [Hoover] of sloppy and stupid editing, at least."

■ In 1987, Rather bought footage stolen from an Afghan journalism student named Mohammed Salam, according to Boston University Dean Joachim Maitre. Rather reported on the Aug. 11, 1987, edition of the CBS Evening News that the tape was made by Hoover and showed "the biggest one-day defeat for Soviet forces since World War II."

Rather said dozens of Soviet tanks had been captured, and 800

Soviet troops killed.

"The trouble is, there were no Soviets there," said Maitre, who headed the film program in which Salam studied. Maitre said he sought and received an apology from CBS. Maitre said the video actually showed a small, but successful attack against Afghan government troops. An article and editorial about the incident were subsequently published in a Boston University newspaper.

Beat Kraettli, a Swiss reporter, originally filed battle accounts that were similar to those aired by CBS News. He told The Post a U.S. envoy in Afghanistan subsequently informed him that CIA satellite photos revealed no major battle between Russians and rebels had taken place as reported by CBS News, and that the casualty numbers cited in the broadcast were grossly inaccurate.

"I felt really very bad that I had reported this false information," said Kraettli. The Swiss newsman attributed his account of the battle to rebel sources and claimed they later told him that Mike Hoover had asked them to exaggerate descriptions of the attack.

A State Department spokesman refused to confirm or deny anyone was sent to Peshawar to discuss "Operation Avalanche" footage. "That's a CBS story, you'll have to contact them," said David Denny.

A CBS spokeswoman would not comment.

SEPTEMBER 27, 1989



Mike Hoover

NYT 10/4

Agreement With a Cameraman

When Mr. Hoover arrived in late 1982 offering to provide film of the war, he found an ally in Mr. Rather. At Mr. Rather's urging, CBS agreed to make the cameraman a freelance. He was paid less than \$40,000, said an employee who worked at CBS News at the time. Mr. Hoover received about half the money in advance, out of which he had to pay for all of his expenses. The rest of the money would be paid if he returned with acceptable film.

He did, as far as CBS was concerned. His early work from Afghanistan that so far has not been questioned impressed the entire CBS News department. It led to further deals with the network, all on a freelance basis, for slightly more money. Mr. Hoover originally provided film of the so-called Operation Blackout for CBS newscasts in November 1984. CBS never accepted Mr. Hoover's work unconditionally, CBS staff members said. Mr. Hoover sent the network film, which was edited by CBS.

CBS News Head Denies Fakery Charges

By BILL CARTER

Responding to allegations that CBS broadcast faked combat films during the war in Afghanistan in the mid-1980's, David W. Burke, the president of CBS News, said yesterday that the charges "are simply not true."

In a memo to CBS News employees yesterday, Mr. Burke said CBS acknowledged only that the film, provided by Mike Hoover, a freelance

cameraman, contained one "unintentional use of a misidented aircraft."

Mr. Hoover, also speaking for the first time on the charges published last week in *The New York Post*, called the accusations that he faked and restaged acts of war "absolute baloney." He said the main sources named by The Post were still there, re-staging actions of Afghan rebels against Soviet forces were not with him at the time of the incidents cited.

The editor of *The Post*, Jerry Nachman, said, "I'm totally comfortable that *The Post* has met its burden of proof, and I've still not seen any from CBS or Mr. Hoover."

In his internal memo, Mr. Burke said CBS News officials had held "extensive conversations with persons in the United States and abroad as well as a searching discussion" with Mr. Hoover and was declaring itself "satisfied" that its coverage was genuine. The memo also praised Dan Rather, the anchor who narrated all the disputed coverage, and the CBS production team that put it together, saying they had met their professional obligations "with complete integrity."

'Vicious Infighting' Charged

Mr. Hoover charged that the accusations against him and CBS were the product of "vicious infighting" among rival factions of Afghan rebels. He said the main accusations in *The Post* that he had staged the 1984 sabotage of electrical pylons by Afghan rebels was "rubish."

The scene of those pylons being blown up are absolutely and totally unfaked," he said.

Of the accusation that he misidentified refugees fleeing battle zones, Mr. Hoover said the scenes may have been shot up to 72 hours after the refugees left their villages, but he denied they were anything but real Afghans fleeing real battles.

Mr. Hoover also admitted that he used some film shot by another cam-

era operator without crediting him, but said it was only 13 seconds' worth, and that he had been given the film by an Afghan leader who received it from the other operator. The Post has accused Mr. Hoover and CBS of stealing the film, and CBS subsequently apologized for having used that portion of the film without crediting the other cameraman.

Several other critics had questioned the exceptional cinematic quality of the work, and Mr. Hoover said yesterday he could understand why. "We used more and better equipment than anybody," he said.

He agreed that his work was often unusually theatrical, but suggested that much of that was due to the altered behavior of the rebels when they became aware of the camera. "It affected what they did dramatically," he said, adding that the rebels would often "ham it up on camera." That is probably what they were doing, he said, in a sequence in the 1987 CBS documentary "The Battle for Afghanistan" when the rebels charged down a mountain to attack the Soviets shouting a war cry. Mr. Hoover said it was not natural for the rebels to let out a cry going into battle, but that it was possible they had been asked to do so by his translator, whose instructions, Mr. Hoover did not understand. "He's yelling at them and maybe he thinks it's Cecil B. DeMille," he said.

NYT 10/5

CBS Film Flap: No Stringers, No News

By Mike Hoover

KELLY Wyo. — In banner headlines, CBS News is accused of shoddy journalism by *The New York Post* and, for nearly a week, Afghanistan pushes Zsa Zsa off the tabloid's cover. "CBS Aired Fake Afghan Battles." The Post charged, citing a 1984 broadcast of the Evening News in which film I shot showed many electrical power pylons being blown up by Afghan rebels.

The press piled on, quoting The Post without checking its sources or bothering to look at the film that aired. It then accused CBS of a coverup when CBS took time to check the allegations before replying. The two Afghan "sources" for the charges denied having said anything close to what was quoted in The Post and were not even in Afghanistan when the filming took place.

The matter has been put to rest. CBS investigated and stands by the authenticity of its report. It was a little farfetched to believe that the rebels "would reconstruct 'destroyed' power pylons so that I could film them being blown up."

A feeding frenzy is not the finest example of journalism. The shrillness makes it hard to acknowledge that even minor mistakes were made. One not mentioned by The Post is that I learned about a year after the film was shot that one of the Afghans shown killed in the fighting was mis-identified.

But the question remains: Did CBS News act improperly by trusting an outsider — a stringer — for coverage inside Afghanistan? What are the risks involved in doing so?

Afghanistan is a small, distant and dangerous place. To do a single story may involve months of walking and waiting — without hotels, telephones, eating rice and goat fat — all for a story that few people care about and that will take less than three minutes to air.

Anybody who covers this story is either crazy or believes that it is a story that desperately needs telling — or both. None of the networks can afford to send people there, however much they would like to. And then there is the problem of finding reliable people

crazy enough to go. You're back to square one.

So, along comes a guy — me — who has been inside Afghanistan with the resistance. The film he brings back fits with other reports. It has shots that would be virtually impossible to fake — incoming rocket fire, cluster bomb attacks and a Soviet helicopter firing on the camera.

Why should CBS doubt it? How could it reasonably check it?

CBS takes the risk. CBS elects to cover the war as best it can. On his own initiative, Dan Rather takes the risk, as he did in Vietnam, and goes into Afghanistan. The others do not.

Using stringers will always be risky business. But the danger of not using stringers is greater: No coverage. If there is no coverage, genocides remain invisible. Those who sit on their lofty perches and proclaim that they would never use stringers are the same people who didn't bring you the genocide in Cambodia. They had no coverage.

Did I dramatize the war? My biggest frustration was that I could never dramatize it enough. I could never bring to people sitting half a world away the horror of what was and still is happening in Afghanistan.

Had I been able to do this, the world would not tolerate what the Soviet Union and the United States wrought in this remote place. Children in Afghanistan are maimed, dying by thousands. That story is competing for air time with a little girl who fell into a Texas well.

Stringer said, "One death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic." I was obsessed to put a face on a million Afghan deaths. I did not succeed, but for six years I tried. Seven of the 10 Afghans that I featured were killed, of our film crew, two Afghans and one American died. I came to hate going inside; each of my 22 trips was to be the last.

I also covered the war from the Soviet side — from inside its hospitals and on patrols in a hostile country. I did not wish these people ill, only god-speed back home — just what they wished themselves.

The attempt to discredit CBS became a nationwide story because of one tabloid. Why? Was this story what it seems or was it an attempt to deflect attention from a seriously bungled war and to discredit the folks

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cally," he said, adding that the rebels

would often "ham it up on camera."

That is probably what they were doing, he said, in a sequence in the 1987 CBS documentary "The Battle for Afghanistan" when the rebels charged down a mountain to attack the Soviets shouting a war cry. Mr. Hoover said it was not natural for the rebels to let out a cry going into battle, but that it was possible they had been asked to do so by his translator, whose instructions, Mr. Hoover did not understand. "He's yelling at them and maybe he thinks it's Cecil B. De-Mille," he said.

Mr. Hoover also admitted that he used some film shot by another cam-

era operator without crediting him,

but said it was only 13 seconds' worth,

and that he had been given the film by

an Afghan leader who received it

from the other operator. The Post has

accused Mr. Hoover and CBS of stealing

the film, and CBS subsequently apolo-

gized for having used that portion of the film without crediting the other cameraman.

Several other critics had ques-

tioned the exceptional cinematic

Luck Is Your Co-Pilot on This Airline

By MARK FINEMAN,
Times Staff Writer

HERAT, Afghanistan—At 24,000 feet, Ariana Airlines Flight 455 to Herat was somewhere over Afghanistan's war-torn Bamyan province last week when Ariana employee Bismillah very casually mentioned the enemy anti-aircraft base located directly below.

A few weeks ago, he told his first American passenger in years, U.S.-backed mujahideen rebels fired an American-supplied Stinger missile at his civilian airliner.

"Not to worry," the cheery Bismillah shouted over the drone of the Soviet-made Antonov-26 turboprop. "It missed."

Crash in Iran

But one anecdote led to another, and Bismillah, who works as a flight dispatcher, quickly moved on to the story of a hijacking in August.

The co-pilot of another Ariana domestic flight, it seems, pulled a gun on his best friend, the pilot, and tried to force him to land in neighboring Iran, where the co-pilot planned to defect to the Muslim rebels. A gun battle ensued in the cockpit, and the plane crashed in Iran, killing six.

"And that's why you see, Ariana Airlines is now down to just five domestic aircraft," Bismillah lamented with a sigh. "You see what it is like trying to run an airline during this war? You see what this war has done to all of us?"

Indeed, after a decade of war, the Afghan government's domestic airline, compete with its battered planes, non-existent air crews and nonexistent schedules, is a typical example of President Najibullah's effort to maintain a semblance of government in a nation of ruins.

Destroyed on Ground

Despite rebel anti-aircraft emplacements, rocket attacks that have destroyed planes on runways and a budget that allows wages of just \$14 a month to employees such as Bismillah, who risk their lives daily, Najibullah has insisted that Ariana's domestic show must go on.

The handful of European and East Bloc diplomatic observers who remain in Kabul, the capital, say such issues are key symbols of survival for Najibullah's beleaguered, pro-Soviet government.

The regime has steadfastly defied Western predictions that it would fall within weeks of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan last February. The troops had been supporting the Afghan government against the rebels.

But, as a Times reporter learned firsthand during a recent visit to Afghanistan, there are prices to pay for such symbolic shows of strength. In the case of Ariana Airlines, the exercise clearly has produced the strangest commercial airline on earth.

Ariana's passengers, for exam-

ple, never have to worry about the airline losing their check-in baggage. They sit on it during the flight. There is no "Fasten Seat Belt" sign—because there are no seat belts. As for "No Smoking" sections, forget it. The ground-maintenance crews puff away on Russian cigarettes even while they refill the wing tanks.

And Ariana Flight 455 from Kabul to the extreme western city of Herat was typical.

It began in a bombed-out storage shed that Ariana calls its domestic departure lounge in Kabul. None of the employees on hand had the faintest idea what time the plane would depart. They didn't know whether Flight 455 would stop somewhere en route to Herat. In fact, they weren't even all that sure there would even be a Flight 455 that day.

"How can we make schedules?" a grum-faced Bismillah later said. "We never really know exactly where our planes are going to land even after they take off."

With boarding passes—tiny, blank pieces of cardboard—hand, passengers were then led to a battered bus outside the shed. The bus windows were sealed shut, but air circulated well through the dozen of shrapnel holes torn into the bus's sides from the weekly rebel rocket attacks on Kabul's only airport.

Stand Up During Takeoff

Soon, it was announced that Flight 455 would indeed depart, and the plane was quickly packed solid with sacks and bags and passengers, some of them forced to stand even during takeoff.

Space on Ariana's few daily flights is coveted, to say the least. After 10 years of war, most of Afghanistan's roads are largely impassable. What Soviet aerial bombardments haven't destroyed, rebel artillery attacks have. Then, there are the added travel risks of kidnapping and robbery by armed bandits and tribal fighters from both warring sides along the roadway.

But there were other glimpses of the war on board the plane.

The vast array of baggage, for example, underscored the strangeness and the brutality of Afghanistan's unending conflict. It ranged from giant tambourines and peacock feathers to artificial limbs and a coffin.

Extreme Isolation

And the extreme isolation of Afghanistan—10 years after Najibullah's ruling party appealed to their Soviet backers and received 115,000 Red Army troops—also was obvious during a brief conversation on board between a Westerner and a young Afghan engineer.

"Where are you from?" the wide-eyed engineer asked after hearing the Westerner speak to a colleague in English.

"America," came the reply.

"My God," the engineer shrieked. "I am so happy. You are the first American I have seen in 10 years. When I was in Kabul in 1978, all of my teachers were Americans. I remember Miss Cooper from Texas. There was another one from Chicago."

"But, why are you on this plane? Why are you going to Herat? There is nothing in Herat but more war."

The war also was discussed in the cockpit, where, as is standard practice, the pilot was an air force colonel and the co-pilot a civilian, a precaution against hijacking and detection.

The practice almost worked two months ago on the ill-fated Ariana domestic flight to Zarani, in the extreme southwestern corner of Afghanistan a few miles from the Iranian border.

"For most of the flight, the de-fecting co-pilot, whom several sources said was the son of Afghanistan's former prime minister Hassan Sharq, tried to persuade the pilot to join him.

It was only after the co-pilot pulled a gun, forcibly took control of the plane and crossed the Iranian border that the pilot fought back, grabbing the pistol and wounding the co-pilot. But it was too late to return to Afghanistan, and the plane crash-landed in Iranian territory, where all the survivors, and the wreckage remain to this day.

"Imagine," Bismillah mused, as Flight 455 slowly crossed over the desolate, lunar Afghan countryside, "our own co-pilot hijacking the plane. You see what it has come to here, what happens when brother fights brother and best friend fights best friend. Where it will go, only God knows."

Symbol of Hope

But Bismillah is one of Afghanistan's many symbols of hope.

Like most Ariana employees, the flight dispatcher also accompanies international Ariana flights to Frankfurt, West Germany; Dubai, in the Persian Gulf; Prague, Czechoslovakia, and New Delhi. He has had many chances to defect or simply walk away. And he has had many good reasons to do so.

Trained by American advisers decades ago, the 28-year veteran Ariana employee would make 100 times his salary outside Afghanistan. During his night stops in foreign countries, Ariana gives him less than \$20 a day for hotel, meals and taxes. And, as he noted, "in most countries, people don't try to shoot down your airplanes."

Resist Temptation

But Bismillah has resisted temptation. In fact, he has forbidden all eight of his children to join the 5 million refugees who have fled Afghanistan. And, Bismillah said, none of the reasons for his reluctance are political.

"I don't like politics. . . ." he said, adding, "In the last 10 years, I have seen for the first time with my own eyes the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Germany, India and Dubai. So many places. And, in any one of those countries, I could make so much more money."

"But I do not go. Those places are not my home. And it is better to stay in your own country. Everyone must do what little they can to keep our country alive. Yes, that is much better."

Suddenly, the Antonov-26 landed downward. Bismillah glanced around sharply to make sure it hadn't hit him. It hadn't; it had simply encountered an air pocket.

LAT 10/7

American's film



Imagine yourself in Afghanistan. It's dusty. It's hot. It's cold. You are a mujahideen, one of the holy warriors unpacking crates of just-arrived weapons—Chinese weapons bought on the open market with American dollars. An American woman, blonde, blue-eyed and holding a video camera, wants to take your picture. It's a crazy world. You smile obligingly, say "camera," and demonstrate on film how the new portable weapons must be gently washed clean of their heavy packing grease before they can be used against Soviet soldiers who patrol your country in tanks when they are not—as rumor has it—to stoned on vodka or hashish.


The American woman is Ottile English. Her usual job for the American Security Council Foundation, she explained to me, is doing workshops, public relations and fund raising. Before her two months inside

Afghanistan, she told her mother in Pennsylvania, "Don't worry, I'm only going to Pakistan" to film refugees from Afghanistan. "She wasn't going to go inside that war-torn and often-forgotten country. But twice the opportunity arose and twice Ottile and camera were smuggled into Afghanistan. Once, dressed in a burka, which is a loose, enveloping garment with veiled eye-holes, and with her hands and toes tinted, she was taken inside Afghanistan for a week. "As a test, I think, to see if I could take it," she said. Later, disguised as a man, she traveled with supply trucks delivering Chinese weapons. Leaving Afghanistan only days before America celebrated Thanksgiving, Ottile was in San Antonio last week to edit her eight hours of film into a documentary. The scenes she recorded of Afghanistan may be the freshest any American can see. Certainly they were the longest I ever saw. . . .

"It's a guerrilla war," Ottile says, "you hit and you run." And while American soldiers might smirk at the T-54 tanks the Soviets have used since World War II, Ottile, who filmed Soviet convoys from her sanctuary in a pomegranate orchard, notes that the rather simple T-54 tanks are easily disassembled, easily repaired, even when "taken out" by bottle bombs planted by the mujahedeen, the holy warriors who can not be stopped.

SAN ANTONIO LIGHT

JANUARY 5, 1988



REPORT FROM QUETTA

A stop in Quetta on the way to an assignment in Nepal gave me a chance to talk with Save the Children Federation personnel, including Afghan engineers, about problems that returning Afghan refugees may have finding building materials when they try to reconstruct their homes in Afghanistan. Since a concentrated house-building effort can be expected in any "return to normalcy," SCF hopes to have action plans in place & building materials available before they are needed. Their aim is to reduce the environmental consequences of the search for the wooden poles & purlins [secondary beams] that will be required to restore thousands of flat-roofed homes. They also hope to prevent any reduction in structural quality that would affect the safety & permanence of the house, especially in seismic areas.

There is no doubt that a large percentage of the domestic buildings has been damaged. In some areas, over 50% of the roofs have been destroyed & in the areas abandoned by the refugees, the destruction is expected to be even greater. It is impossible to predict in detail the impact of the refugee-return on either the building material supply or on construction practices, but certain components of the rebuilding process are predictable: (1) much of the house-building labor will be supplied by the family itself; (2) old houses will be restored on existing plans (sometimes with existing walls) as opposed to "new" houses being constructed; (3) plans & efforts to reconstruct will begin immediately on return. In other words, the returning householder will begin, for better or worse, to restore his homestead to its prewar condition, the same size, the same style, in the same place, & constructed in the same way. Any scheme to aid reconstruction must recognize & complement his effort if it is to be effective.

Restoring masonry is not expected to pose serious problems. Mud or stone walls can be repaired or replaced as required using abundant "free" materials & "free" family or village labor. Assistance with earthen walls & masonry roofs (e.g., domes) might

be considered in later relief efforts if construction problems become evident.

Rebuilding earth-covered, wood-supported, flat roofs poses the greatest problem. The lack, or increased cost, of the materials traditionally used in these heavy roofs, especially the strong supporting wood members, will be the major obstacle. In many regions, the effective functional life of the wood supports has been estimated at about 15 years. This figure accepts the incremental replacement of weakened wooden members as required.

The 15-year life span figure is equivalent to replacing approximately 7% of the roofs in a particular region each year. Wood supply & production, either local or imported, had developed over the years to approach this level of demand. In an area where 25-30% of the roofs are known to have been destroyed, the demand could easily reach 400-500% of the normal requirement if the houses are to be restored in a single year.

In many regions, meeting this demand will be difficult, if not impossible. Previously existing stands of trees may have been used for fuel or destroyed during the war. In some areas, mines will have to be cleared before families can gather wood. Traditional supply areas may be unable to ship wood to the construction region when it is needed. Disorganization during the return may allow prices to rise beyond "what the traffic will bear" & may encourage deforestation in neighboring regions or in Pakistan.

This combination of high demand & limited supply will not reduce the number of houses to be reconstructed. Any remaining stands of usable trees will be cut & builders may use wooden structural members smaller & weaker than usual.

In the regions from which many of the refugees now in Quetta came, for example, approximately 21 mature poplar trees are required for the major roof poles in a traditional 3-room house. An equal amount is estimated to be necessary for the secondary roof members & the wood mats which support the roof's mud covering. These needs, combined with

the wood required for fuel will place a 1-year demand on a region's forest cover equivalent to many years of normal cutting. To restore each 1,000 households to prewar standards, 21,000 mature poplar trees would be cut as well as perhaps an equal number of immature trees.

And, because of the increased cost of wood or the difficulty in finding suitable "free" wood, the builder may be tempted to try to support his roof with weaker members than those which he would traditionally use. In extreme cases this could be dangerous; in all cases it will require more frequent renewal as the smaller, weaker places must be replaced. This will continue the accelerated demand. Unless a deliberate tree replacement program is successful, the effect of this tree removal on the environment could be permanent.

To avoid this, material supply proposals must be in place as far in advance of their need as possible. The plans must be flexible enough to respond quickly to political changes which speed up or retard the refugee's return or affect the supply process. Plans must also include provisions to reflect changes in the relative cost or availability of building materials.

One of the more interesting proposals is to provide returning refugees with small steel I-beams for the primary roof supports & large-diameter bamboo pieces for cross members. This structural system is already cost competitive with wood supports in the Quetta region. The substitution of these materials would pose few transportation problems & their use requires little or no training for the house builders. Steel is an attractive alternative to precast concrete, a frequently proposed substitute. Concrete's weight, its fragility in transport, the training needed for its use, & the quality control required for its production are drawbacks.

The I-beam proposal suggests that refugee house builders be supplied with enough material to support the

roof of one large room. Supplies might be distributed through a "material for work" program or subsidized to a level that would make it cheaper than wood for roofing. The steel sections required are currently produced in Pakistan, and other nations might be asked for contributions once the required sizes are known. Bamboo of the appropriate size is available in Pakistan & a process exists for treating it to make it insect proof & perhaps more permanent than untreated wood.

Many components of the problem & the repercussions of remedial measures still need study. To these must be added the unpredictable political situation & the social & economic problems that will accompany resettlement. The problems of food & employment will certainly be followed by that of shelter. Beyond supplying tents or other temporary measures, the responsibility for providing "permanent" shelter must rest with the returning Afghan families.

In the case of Afghanistan, this may have long-term consequences on the already fragile environment that will be difficult to reverse. It is encouraging that a potential problem has been identified before it has occurred. Providing the appropriate guidance, including the devising of acceptable structural alternatives, is a challenge that Afghan engineers, assisted by concerned agencies, are trying to meet. - Daniel Dunham

Dan Dunham, a specialist in tropical architecture & emergency housing, is a consultant for the UN & USAID.



Afghanistan after the turmoil

WORLD HEALTH, July 1989

by Mumtaz Hussain

The tragedy of Afghanistan is probably unique in the annals of human conflict. Long years of bitter fighting have caused the death of almost a million people, permanently disabled tens of thousands, and disrupted and destroyed most of the country's infrastructure as well as the vital agricultural sector. Almost 45 per cent of the population have been forced either to seek asylum in neighbouring countries or to flee to safer areas within the country away from strife-torn zones.

In the 1970s, Afghanistan was ranked among the least developed countries of the world but its meagre infrastructure and services were beginning to expand and progress seemed feasible. But nine years of war have brought even this progress to an end. Despite the Geneva Accord signed in April 1988, fighting continues.

Meanwhile some six million people have sought refuge in the neighbouring countries of Pakistan (3.5 million) and the Islamic Republic of Iran (over 2.3 million). Another two million are internally displaced. The deterioration of the national infrastructure, combined with the loss of human resources, poses awesome problems for Afghanistan and has imposed fearful strains on the social and economic policies of the host countries.

In the health sector alone, the situation is alarming. Infant mortality stands at 185 per 1,000 live births and maternal mortality at 329 per 10,000 births – four to five times more than that of some other developing countries. Life expectancy is estimated at a mere 30 years. Malaria, tuberculosis, diarrhoeal and respiratory diseases are major health problems and preventable childhood diseases exact a heavy toll. Safe drinking water is available only to a very small percentage of the population. Poor environmental health conditions combined with a low literacy rate, particularly among women, promote high morbidity, infirmity and mortality.

Against this depressing scenario, the destruction of recent years has disrupted practically all the operational disease control programmes.

Most people, particularly in the countryside, have little or no access to preventive and curative health care, and the numbers of the disabled and handicapped have increased. Health manpower has been severely depleted, because training programmes have been interrupted and trained personnel have left the country . . .

Both Pakistan and Iran have established Refugee Commissions in the Ministries of Interior, with a Chief Commission of Refugees charged with arranging shelter, feeding and multi-sectoral care. The refugees register in reception centres and are then directed to the areas demarcated for future "settlement". There the similarities end: the actual programmes for care of refugees differ widely.

In Pakistan, most newcomers are settled in some 300 refugee villages and provided with food rations,

materials for shelter building, clothing and financial subsidies. The Afghan Refugee Health Programme is a collaborative effort between the government of Pakistan and the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and is responsible for providing adequate preventive and curative health care through the strategy of primary health care. There are now 217 basic health units and 41 sub-units delivering basic health care in the refugee villages. Secondary and tertiary care is provided by the host country's national health institutions.

Some 2,800 male community health workers and 1,600 female health workers or traditional birth attendants have been trained. Disease control programmes (malaria and tuberculosis control, and immunization) have contributed significantly to a general improvement in health. For example, the infant mortality rate among Afghan refugees is estimated at 87 deaths per 1,000 live births.

Apart from UNHCR, WHO has contributed by providing expertise and resources for disease control (particularly tuberculosis and malaria) as well as by making WHO staff available for coordinating and putting into effect health care delivery. Non-governmental organizations too are significant contributors to the programme, particularly for primary health care and training of health manpower.

The Iranian government's strategy for refugee care differs substantially in that the refugees, after preliminary registration, are not accommodated in organized refugee villages but are dispersed into towns and villages, mainly in the border provinces of Khorasan, Sistan-Baluchistan and Kerman. Some 250,000 are lodged in spontaneous camps, having gone to these locations on their own without passing through the registration process. The registered refugees receive identity cards and are free to work in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs. No food or monetary subsidies are given, and health needs are met through established national health facilities. Because of this, and because they are widely dispersed, it is difficult to gauge exactly their health status. However, both in Iran and Pakistan, the level of health services provided is qualitatively and quantitatively better than that previously available to the displaced Afghans.

But Iran's national health system has itself come under considerable strain, given Iran's own problems of development and war conditions. By 1986, UNHCR became involved, and a health plan was formulated to help Iran cope with this heavy commitment. UNHCR has been contributing US \$7 to \$10 million in the health sector alone. As in Pakistan, WHO has been instrumental in planning and putting into effect the UNHCR-funded programmes.

The Geneva Accord signed in April 1988 brought forth hope for Afghanistan to return to peaceful conditions and the UN Secretary-General established in May 1988 a special Programme of Humanitarian and Economic Assistance, later named UN Operation Salam. Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan was appointed Coordinator

for the planning of this monumental task. The international community responded enthusiastically, both morally and in material terms, and UN agencies were asked to cooperate actively with the coordinator.

Technical assistance

WHO has signified its commitment to assist Operation Salam to the fullest extent possible and has provided technical assistance for assessing needs, for planning and for ascertaining how health care could be made available to Afghans irrespective of where they are located. As all three countries concerned are Member States of EMRO, the Regional Office has contributed greatly to developing Operation Salam's health sector programme. This includes epidemiological surveys and programme planning for disease prevention, treatment and control; restoring health facilities and their equipment; training health manpower; and re-establishing the logistic and supportive mechanisms required to sustain the restored health services.

Progress so far is encouraging, despite the severe constraints. Many tons of medical supplies have already been airlifted to Kabul for the assistance of vulnerable groups. Resources have been allocated to strengthen health facilities in some areas bordering Pakistan, particularly in the fields of nutrition, immunization and control of diarrhoeal diseases. As a prelude to starting a community-based rehabilitation programme, orthopaedic workshops are being set up in three provinces.



Associated Press

ROCKET ATTACK — A man carries his injured wife from their home in Kabul, Afghanistan, after a barrage of rockets hit the city on the 70th anniversary of Afghan independence from Britain. No one claimed responsibility for the attack.

Asbury Park Press

8/20



A woman health visitor examines an Afghan refugee in a tented reception centre in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan.

Photo WHO/UNHCR/S. Errington



Amin-Arsala

By Steve Coll
Washington Post Foreign Service

It wasn't very long ago that Hedayat Amin-Arsala lived in a large and comfortable house on one of those three-syllable streets below Chevy Chase Circle. In the mornings he swam in the great school of commuter fish to his office in downtown Washington at the World Bank, where he worked for almost 20 years as a loan officer. His salary was good. His house was appreciating. He was thinking about college for his children.

But now Amin-Arsala lives here, at No. 18, Dean's Hotel, where the dust and heat congeal at the back of your throat and the flies buzz in hypnotic circles, as if stuck in a holding pattern above some insect airport. There are two rooms, dimly lit, sparsely furnished. Besides accommodating Amin-Arsala and his nephew, the rooms also served until very recently as the Finance Ministry of the fledgling Afghan Interim Government, the main political structure of the U.S.-backed Afghan rebels, known as *mujaheddin*. The rebels are seeking the overthrow of Kabul's Soviet-backed regime. As finance minister, Amin-Arsala manages the exiled government's money, which for much of this year wasn't enough to pay for his tea.

"Have you met Amin-Arsala?" Western diplomats and journalists trying to sort out Afghanistan's 11-year war asked one another here in Peshawar, near the border with Afghanistan, where the main mujaheddin groups are based. "He's very smart, isn't he?"

He is, but of course what they mean is that he is Westernized—a Chevy Chase man, a World Bank man—and thus Amin-Arsala stands in contrast to most mujaheddin leaders, to the fundamentalist mullahs and the bear-hugging military commanders wearing ammunition belts and gold Rolex watches. To the Westerners who bankroll and arm the Afghan rebels, he is, well, reassuring.


His familiarity may be partly an illusion. Hedayat Amin-Arsala is the eldest son of the eldest son of the eldest son of the great chief of the Ghilzai Tribes, which is to say that in Afghanistan he can make certain claims to power. It is the stirring of his Afghan tribal blood, he intimates, that brought him here recently to the *jihad*, or holy war—that caused him to quit the World Bank and leave his American wife and children at least temporarily alone in Northwest Washington.

"It's very painful to be away from each other for long periods of time," he says of his decision to leave Washington. "My children, particularly the younger one, at times feel hurt to be left behind. But I think they understand what my family means and what my compulsions are. . . . From childhood I always wanted to play a role in Afghanistan."

The story of Amin-Arsala's ambiguous and as yet unfinished journey from Afghanistan to Washington and halfway back again runs parallel to his country's tumultuous recent history. Its themes and struggles—modernity vs.

tradition, Islam vs. the West—underscore some of the vexing questions that now confront a people whose nation has been virtually obliterated by a decade of war.

"I'm optimistic," Amin-Arsala declares, sounding more ominous than cheerful. "All of



Hedayat Amin-Arsala.

This destruction should give us an opportunity to think more creatively about ourselves."

Even half asleep, ushering in a visitor who has rapped unexpectedly on the door in the late afternoon, there is something overwhelmingly serious about Hedayat Amin-Arsala. At 47, he carries a modest belly, sports a gray mustache and goatee, and gazes out through coal-black eyes. He speaks in deep, slow, sonorous tones, and in his loose, traditional Afghan shirt, he could be mistaken easily for a Shakespearean actor.

If you ask Amin-Arsala to tell you why he left his job and his family to come to this wild west frontier town, with its overloaded donkey carts and well-stocked missile shops, he starts talking about the 19th century, which may be in part an emotional evasion, but which also says something about the depth and complexity of Afghanistan and its war.

Amin-Arsala's ancestors hailed from the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar and fought in three wars against the British. His great-great-grandfather, so the story goes, helped to lead the great winter ambush of 1842, the battle that gave the Afghans a reputation for anti-imperial ferocity they have never lost. That cold January, 16,500 British soldiers and their families began to march east from Kabul toward what is now Pakistan, retreating from a four-year war in Afghanistan that had been a fiasco. Only one of them, an assistant surgeon of the East India Co. named William Brydon, made it to the Khyber Pass alive.

"The enemy . . . pressed hard upon our rear and cut up great numbers. The confusion became terrible, all discipline was at an end, and the shouts of 'Halt! Halt!' became incessant," Brydon recorded in his immortal report of the ambush.

"They disappeared," Amin-Arsala says laconically of the retreating British.

In the decades that followed, Amin-Arsala drifted in and out of power, in and out of exile. There were marriages of convenience, murders, betrayals, coups and counter-coups. As leaders of the Ghilzai Tribes, the Amin-Arsalas played second fiddle to the Durranis, the tribal Afghans who controlled the court at Kabul so much of the last century. Amin-Arsala's father was born in exile in Lahore, Pakistan, following a particularly nasty spat with the monarchy. The family did return to favor, and Amin-Arsala was raised in Kabul, but he fled when he was 19, driven out by the ancient rivalries and feuds.

"I would have been killed probably a number of times by now," Amin-Arsala says when asked why he left home.

It was October 1963 when the 21-year-old Amin-Arsala arrived in Washington broke and in exile. The government of Afghanistan had sent him to Czechoslovakia to train in the art of managing a munitions factory. Amin-Arsala bolted. After returning to Kabul for a home leave, he boarded a plane for London, changed for the United States, and the next thing he knew he was in downtown D.C., surrounded by the monuments and the great federal bureaucracies, wondering how he was going to find for himself.

It helped that his family was acquainted with Afghanistan's then-ambassador to the United States, so Amin-Arsala wandered over to see him. The ambassador told him that he had missed the start of the school year and would likely have to wait until the next fall, and he suggested that Amin-Arsala go to Vermont and teach languages in President Kennedy's Peace Corps training program for Afghanistan. Amin-Arsala did, and from there he earned enough money to enter junior college, where he won scholarship awards, and to bounce from one university to another, finally earning a master's degree. He wound up back in Washington, enrolled in a doctoral program at George Washington University, took a job at the World Bank, married a woman from Rye, N.Y., and surrounded himself with the enviable comforts of the American bourgeoisie.

Still, through all of those years and all of those changes, there was the *qawm*—the network of tribal and social and family ties that is at the center of any Afghan's identity. The threads of Amin-Arsala's *qawm* ran directly to the center of the Afghan state. He knew generals and ambassadors, governors and ministers, and they knew of him too. Beginning with the ouster of King Zaher Shah in a coup in 1973, Amin-Arsala stood on the periphery of Afghanistan's volatile history, tracking its plots and factions from his home below Chevy Chase Circle and looking, he says now, for a way back in. He came close to returning to Afghanistan once in the late 1970s, he says, just before the communist coup that touched off the

Soviet invasion, but the time wasn't right.

After the Soviet troops came and the jihad began in earnest, he took a leave of absence from the World Bank and traveled to Pakistan to help establish the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), one of the seven major mujaheddin political groups and the one that has been the most traditionalist and tribal-based, eschewing radical Islamic ideology and harkening for a return to Afghanistan's pluralistic, hierarchical past. The front is headed by Amin-Arsala's old friend Pir Gailani, whose family owned a European car dealership in Kabul before the Communists came to power. The Gailanis, too, have a certain understanding of the West.

"We started NIFA in a sense together," Amin-Arsala says. "I thought it might be a good idea to strengthen one group so it would become stronger and absorb the others. . . . We thought along the same lines. We both believe in a forward-looking, open society—Islamic, of course."

Of course. In the urgency of his aethoughts, Amin-Arsala sounds something like Benazir Bhutto, prime minister of the country in which he now resides, a Harvard-educated woman in whom the tension between a secular past and an Islamic present is almost palpable.

The first time Amin-Arsala came to Pakistan to help with the jihad, he had to keep his activities secret—the World Bank was not too comfortable with the idea of one of its senior loan officers participating in a foreign revolution. When he returned to Washington after his leave of absence, he began immediately to think about when he would go back. He wrestled with his two identities: the Chevy Chase father and householder, and the Afghan tribal chief.

"I know it's been tough for them," he says of his American wife and children. "It's been tough for me. I somehow can't believe that anyone in my position would not do what I did. A foreign government was imposing its will, and my country was being occupied by a foreign power. There was a lot of killing and destruction, and, at the same time, here I was, living a pretty comfortable life outside and being reasonably well-educated, and belonging to an influential tribal family. I couldn't think of anything to do but go back."

In several hours of conversation, turning the same subject over and over, you can hear Amin-Arsala move almost unconsciously between two distinct explanations as to why he is living here at Dean's Hotel. One of his rationales is noble and selfless. The other, offered in a tone of candor and humility, is compulsive and even seash.

"I thought it was my duty," he says at one point. And then, in the next breath: "I thought it was something I could not do without." In the Afghan war, the lines between ambition and self-sacrifice are often hard to find.

In 1987, the World Bank initiated a major reorganization, designed in part to trim its middle- to upper-level staff. Attractive compensation packages were offered to anyone willing to quit. "It was a godsend for someone who wanted to resign," Amin-Arsala recalls. "The thing is, I would have left in any case. It was as if providence had something to do with it. I was able to leave with some degree of financial comfort."

And so he packed up his belongings and flew back to Pakistan, settling finally in Peshawar and at Dean's, a charming if unluxurious hostel that is home to a panoply of scruffy photographers and freelance journalists here to cover the war. Amin-Arsala doesn't socialize much with the press corps, though. Since his arrival, he has been intimately engaged in the treacherous politics of the Afghan resistance—a game whose outcome will determine whether his journey back to Afghanistan will ever be completed.

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In the spectrum of mujaheddin politics and ideology, Amin-Arsala resides with those who are often referred to in the West as the moderates, or traditionalists. The dichotomy of moderates vs. fundamentalists in the politics of the Afghan resistance has its uses. But it hardly explains the complexity of the struggle in which Amin-Arsala and his allies are engaged. Neither does it help much in predicting which groups will wind up on top, or whether any of the current interim government ministers, Amin-Arsala among them, will eventually take power in Kabul.

Amin-Arsala's background is itself an important obstacle to advancement within the Afghan resistance. The relationship between many mujaheddin leaders and the countries that have provided them support, notably the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, is intensely ambivalent. Rebel political leaders need guns and money from the West to apply power through patronage. But none of them can afford to be seen as a *lucky* in a foreign country.

A tribal chief such as Amin-Arsala possesses a power base that is potentially independent of outside support. Rebel leaders and Western diplomats in Pakistan say he has skillfully taken advantage of his tribal and family connections, his qawn, to build political alliances beyond his own rebel faction, NIFA. One of Amin-Arsala's cousins, for example, is Abdul Haq, a legendary resistance guerrilla who is aligned with a fundamentalist Islamic group usually at odds with Amin-Arsala's party.

And yet backing from one of the principal foreign supporters of the resistance is crucial for any mujaheddin leader's success, and Amin-Arsala is no exception. He was brokered into position as finance minister of the new interim government during intense, closed-door negotiations last

winter. According to diplomatic sources here, the Pakistani Intelligence Service, with which the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has close links, played an important role in those negotiations. The exact trade-off and discussions that led to Amin-Arsala's appointment aren't known, but diplomats here say the United States was pleased by his nomination because of his background at the World Bank and his familiarity with what one diplomat called "the practicalities of international finance."

Which leads to the heart of Amin-Arsala's current political predicament in Peshawar: What a Westerner might consider practical, some fundamentalist mujaheddin leaders consider blasphemous. According to the interpretations of some of his brethren in the Afghan resistance, for example, Islamic banking principles forbid the payment or extraction of any interest on loans. That concept, whatever its religious roots, does not currently find favor at the International Monetary Fund. Amin-Arsala says he is studying the principles of Islamic banking, but it is clear that his economic ideas are primarily secular.

"My hope is that the international community that has helped us to a large extent during the last seven years will enable us to create a new Afghanistan," he says. "We need a massive, well-thought-through reconstruction program, so that people from all quarters can get involved. All of this requires wisdom and farsightedness and openness of mind."

But are the mujaheddin capable of mustering this wisdom and openness of mind, of rebuilding a country that currently has few roads and virtually no secular schools outside the cities controlled by the Kabul regime?

"Obviously, there are certain elements that are closed-minded and have specific thoughts about the future of Afghanistan, but I think they will not have the support of the majority of the people. If these kinds of people stop development assistance and reconstruction assistance from flowing into Afghanistan and the people of Afghanistan find out, then they will get rid of them—politically," he adds hastily, in a soft and clarifying tone.

A more immediate question is whether Amin-Arsala and his fellow mujaheddin will ever make it to Kabul. Just six months ago, when the last of the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, the rebels seemed on the verge of a complete victory. It was widely predicted that the Kabul regime of President Najibullah would collapse within weeks. Instead, the war has become bogged down in military stalemates, and the mujaheddin, far from uniting as the United States urged and hoped, have begun to fight among themselves more intensely than ever.

The interim government in which Amin-Arsala serves is at the center of the squabbling. Some of its members think all of the resistance's resources should be channeled through its ministry. But the leaders of the seven main mujaheddin political parties have been reluctant to give up control of their guns and money to an amorphous government in exile. The defense ministry still has a few weapons to distribute, according to diplomatic sources, and until re-

cently Amin-Arsala, the nominal finance minister, had to pay for furniture and tea out of his own pocket.

"I was always of the opinion that all of the financial resources of the resistance should be channeled through the interim government and the ministry of finance," the minister of finance says. "As you can imagine, it's very difficult to come up with a sort of broad agreement on that. There are differences of opinion."

That the finance ministry was broke was a source of embarrassment to the mujaheddin, and lately there have been signs of improvements. Rebel and diplomatic sources in Pakistan say that early in August, Amin-Arsala received a check for about \$1 million with which to open his ministry's first major bank account. In Peshawar, he has begun to advertise for the recruitment of junior ministers. And soon, if the plan holds, the ministry will move out of Dean's Hotel altogether and into offices of its own.

The only thing that seems certain about Afghanistan is its unpredictability, and so it is impossible to say, as another so-called summer "fighting season" draws to a close, whether or how Hedayat Amin-Arsala will make it back to the land of his tribe. He is more fortunate than most mujaheddin. If the jihad collapses into fratricidal civil war or just fades away, as some of its leaders are beginning to feel it might, he can always try to revert to his other self, and return to the prosperity of Northwest Washington. A split identity may not lead to peace of mind, but it offers a certain flexibility.

And yet it may not be possible to reverse the peculiar muddle crisis that brought Amin-Arsala to Dean's Hotel. Having stepped across a line in the sand, he does not sound as if he plans to pull

"his foot back, 'll you want to live a comfortable life in China? Or do you want to remember he's a visitor? he asks, reflecting the ambivalence he feels about his life once."

THE WASHINGTON POST

AUGUST 30, 1989



Woman finds living, teaching in Third World fulfilling

By LYNNE LANGLEY
Post-Courier Reporter

With the work day over, Robyn A. Bantel was chatting with friends just outside her house in Peshawar, Pakistan. She hardly noticed the popping of nearby guns: Shooting and death are a way of life there.

"Then I felt a bullet go right over my head," she says. She and her friends scattered and she raced for the safety of the American Club.

She doesn't know whether the gun was aimed at her. Americans are mugged and women get into trouble for simply riding a bicycle in public, she notes. "I've been shot at, but the worst danger is random gunfire and traffic."

Last week and this, she swathed in safety and comfort at the Hanahan home of her parents, artist Mary Lou Bantel and retired Navy officer Robert F. Bantel.

She moved to Charleston with her parents during her high school years. After earning her Ph.D. in philosophy at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, she taught at colleges and universities there for eight years.

But now Dr. Bantel says Peshawar, not the U.S.A., is home. On Aug. 2 she'll return to teach Afghan refugees for the U.S. Agency for International Development.

She hears gunfire as routinely as the daily call to prayer. She must cover her face and head with a *chador* in public and she leads classes women are never permitted to take. She's told not to leave her house without a security guard. She has to filter and boil drinking water 20 minutes. And the 105-degree heat of dust-filled days bastes everyone in perspiration that turns to mud.

"I've never been happier," says the 41-year-old woman. "I wanted to go to Pakistan. It seemed like the most exciting place on earth... I wanted to be someone I could see history being made."

In 1985, with her philosophy degree all but useless in this country, she signed up for the Peace Corps and taught English in Casablanca, Morocco. A 1987 stint in Iran cut short by the revolution there, had only whetted her appetite.

"I wish I had stayed. I did not like living in the United States when I came back."

"After living in a Third World country, you see America in a new light. The excesses come to the fore — the commercialism, the consumerism; the xenophobia. I did not fit in anymore. I had a more international outlook than my friends and they were pursuing what seemed like narrow careers... I had to find people of my ilk, and I was not finding too many of them in Pittsburgh."

She applied to programs in Third World countries and received a job offer from the International Rescue Committee, the



Staff Photo by Wade Spees

Dr. Bantel displays material distributed to Afghans showing the dangers of mines.

oldest and largest U.S. organization that helps Third World refugees. Two months ago, she accepted the USAID position.

Both educational efforts are based in Peshawar, headquarters for 60 international organizations. The mile-wide University Town, also known as Aid Ghetto, is home for some Pakistanis and Afghans and for most foreigners who work with the Afghans, she says.

There three cultures, four languages (including English), six ethnic groups and seven political parties mix. Peshawar is renowned for its market. As a woman, however, she dare not linger alone and she claims to be Canadian when Pakistani shop owners inquire.

In some ways, she says, her life is "an escape from reality," a life of adventure and romance.

This vacation in Hanahan may represent a taste of reality that has, she suggests, answered any lingering questions.

Of the people there, she says, "You have a lot of oddballs, a lot of adventurous people — spies, gemologists, drug runners, government agency people, private businessmen, U.S. Army Special Forces and people just on a lark."

There's romance, she notes with a smile, and men outnumber women about 15 to one. "The so-

cial life is fantastic. There is a constant stream of parties, dances, games and trips. I'm missing out on a California beach party by being here — they're shipping in sand for the party."

Americans usually volunteer or are assigned on six-month contracts and most are eager to leave when their time is up, she says. After 26 months, Dr. Bantel is not.

"It's wonderful work, social life and interesting cultures. It's what makes me feel alive, what makes me feel glad every morning that I live in Peshawar and no place else. We are appreciated there. I never had students stateside who appreciated my teaching."

An estimated third of the Afghan population is dead and the country laced with some 30 million Soviet mines, she says. Towns are obliterated. The Afghans she meets usually have lost their homes, at least some of their family, even limbs. Yet her students crave the education war has interrupted, she finds.

"I have not met a single person who has given up hope. They latch onto any opportunity. They are so eager to work and are so hard working. They will do anything to better themselves. And they have complete trust in God that they will be rescued from Pakistan and will return to their country."

Charleston, S.C.

The News and Courier

July 25, 1989



If a student doesn't appear for class one day, it's because he's fighting the "holy war," she explains.

In five-hour classes, she teaches English language and lifestyle.

"My job is to help soften the blow of culture shock. They have never been exposed to other cultures."

Students who pass an English exam will spend next year at the University of Nebraska studying such subjects as engineering, agriculture or medicine. Then the young men will return to help rebuild their country.

Already Afghans are working on wells, schools and clinics just across the Pakistani border.

"My students asked me to tell America they appreciate the military and economic support of the American people and the moral support, too."

"I would like people to know the war is not over and refugees are in as much humanitarian need as ever. Families walk hundreds of miles through rugged mountains to reach Peshawar and camp out until someone shows them the way to the refugee camp."

"I miss Peshawar. I am glad to touch base with friends and family here, but I am anxious to go home. I realize how impossible it would be for me to move back here. This is the break for me. I probably will be on the international circuit for the rest of my life."

EVENTS

AFGHANISTAN AFTER THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL was the topic of a panel at the Mid-Atlantic Regional meeting of the Association for Asian Studies at Georgetown University on Oct. 29. E.T. Green, Dept. of State, spoke on the refugee situation; "Media Map at Last" was Rhea Talley Stewart's topic; Voice of America's Habib Tegey addressed the "Politics of Power"; Moh'd Khan discussed the history & future of the Afghan resistance; Steve Galster spoke on Moscow & Washington's struggle for Kabul. Robert Neumann moderated the panel.

Olivier Roy presented a paper on ETHNIC IDENTITY & POLITICAL EXPRESSION IN NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN at the Middle East Inst. at Columbia University in July.

Members of the Afghan delegation to the 44th UNGA:

H.E. Mr. Abdul Wakil
Foreign Minister of the ROA

H.E. Mr. Noor Ahmad Noor
State Min. for Foreign Affairs & Permanent Representative to the UN for the ROA.

Mr. M. Karim Hoqoq
Dir. of the UN Dept.
Min. of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Moh'd Eshaq Roshan-Rawaan
Minister Counsellor
Mission of Afghanistan

Mr. Mohauddin Taeb
First Sec'y
Mission of Afghanistan

Alternate delegates are Mr. Moh'd Sarwar & Mr. Abdul Ahad Wolosi from the ROA Min. of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Moh'd Wasil Mehnat, Mr. Haji M. Rasmi & Mr. Mir Mohammadi from the Afghan Mission.



The next FORUM PAPER will be "The Role of Afghan Women After Repatriation" by Nancy Hatch Dupree. Those subscribers who ordered the paper will receive it with the next issue. If you didn't order it but want a copy, send us \$5 & we'll send it to you, too.

The deadline for the next FORUM is 12/15.

خوارون جه د روتنی
د ښوونی د روتنی
م ډاښدی تویی
"When the poor began fasting,
The days became longer."

Famine threatens, disease kills people in Ghoor

By: Abu Pana

I and a friend of mine were sent by a relief organization to Ghoor province to survey the conditions of health clinics there.

We started our journey from Quetta on June 5. It took us five days to reach Ghoor. On the way we passed through provinces of Kandahar and Helmand.

The Kabul regime controls part of Chekcheran, the provincial capital and Shahruk district. The rest of province is controlled by the Mujahideen.

The Jamiat commander in Chekcheran is Maulawi Musa. Since he is a religious scholar and a good fighter, he is respected by all the Mujahideen in the area.

A Harkat-e-Inqilab commander Ibrahim Baig had established secret contacts with the regime. The Mujahideen from all parties raised against him. He was forced to openly join the regime and establish posts in Ghoor, Kamranji and Jelgy Mazar.

The Mujahideen fought against him for 15 days. Some of his men with 225 guns were captured the rest retreated to Jawain sub-district of Badghis which is in control of the Kab' regime.

Ghoor is a mountainous province with cold weather. The land is less fertile and the people are very poor.

When we were in the area measles and whooping cough were killing a large number of children. In each village from 20 to 30 children had died and we were a witness to the tragedy. There was no vaccination facilities in the province. The four clinics in Ghoor were ill-equipped and manned by paramedics who had been trained in Peshawar for a few months.

Last winter's harsh climate killed most of the cattle and some children.

In Lal-Wa-Sar Jangal district which is controlled by Naore and Sepah (two Iran-based parties) the situation was better. There was a hospital founded by a French organization.

Ordinary people in Ghoor could not find sugar and rice. Only commanders possessed these two luxury items. Most of the people could not light lamps due to fuel shortages. Captured trucks and jeeps were facing the same problem.

Elders told us the only person who had helped them once in their lives was Zahir Shah. "During the famine of 1970, Zahir Shah's regime gave 21 kilograms of wheat per family. After that no ruler and no Mujahideen leader has done anything to us," they said.

The price of food was very high. Four kilograms of wheat was sold for 700 Afghans.

People sold their cattle and walked one week to bring food from Takhi area in Herat province. Every body in Ghoor complained about shortages of food. They expected the Muslim leaders to relieve their pain by helping them.

Madrassas (religious schools) were open in different parts of Ghoor in which religious scholar taught students. There was no ordinary school for children. The reason was deep suspicion by the local religious Ulama about schools. They had seen how the communist regime used school against Islam.

Lal-Wa-Sar Sangali district is an exception. Schools are opened for both boys and girls.

In Ghoor there are six parties: Jamiat, Mahaz Milli (Pir Galan), Hezb Islami (Hikmatyar), Harkat Inqilab Islami, Iihad Islami (Prof. Sayyaf) and Jabbah (Prof. Mujaddidi). Jamiat is the dominating force in the province.

Historic sites could be seen in most parts of Ghoor. The famous Jam Minarets are located on the banks of Hari Rood river in Shahruk district.

After Having Fought a War, A Soldier Becomes a Cadet

By DONATELLA LORCH

WEST POINT, N.Y. — The only warning was a loud swish. Yama Zikria remembers hitting the ground. The mortar's explosive rained dirt and rocks on him. Bullets slammed the wall behind his head.

A man in front of him stepped on a fist-size land mine. Yama Zikria recalls the man's quizzical look as he sat at his mangled leg.

This happened two years ago, when Yama Zikria, shouldering a Canon camera and an AK-47 assault rifle, trekked through Afghanistan's arid mountains and fought alongside ragtag groups of Muslim guerrillas. He fired anti-aircraft guns, sat out bombings and ran from mortar and artillery fire. Now he is 19 years old and facing what he said is a small war unto itself: survival as a West Point plebe.

In an institution devoted to war, Cadet Zikria is a rarity — a student who has experienced battle.

"He is held in a very special place," said Tactical Officer Jeffrey Wear. "It is not the norm what he has done."

Learning Discipline

For plebes, every minute from 5:30 A.M. wake up is regimented. With tucked shirts and shined shoes, they must walk no slower than 120 paces a minute and hug close to the walls in their dormitories. They may answer upperclassmen only in full sentences. At mess hall, they must sit at attention and serve upperclassmen while trying to discreetly grab bites, laying down their forks between each mouthful.

The plebe year is a struggle for anyone. But perhaps for Cadet Zikria — an Afghan-American from Tenafly, N.J. — it has been a little bit harder.

Cadet Zikria's initiation to war came amid the loosely organized guerrillas in eastern Afghanistan. The resistance fighters were successful against great odds, eventually forcing Soviet troops from the country, but there was a casualness about life in the mountains. No regimented meals, no dress code, few orders to follow. Cadet Zikria's group once sat out a bombing raid sipping tea. Only two ranks existed — commander and mujahed. The guerrillas followed their commander because of his age and battle experience, but they could openly disagree with him and often did.

'Do-What-You-Want' Zikria

That is not the way things work at West Point. Once Cadet Zikria took an upperclassman's preference for a particular soft drink too casually and served him the wrong drink. As discipline, he had to "walk the area" — march alone, shouldering a rifle in a courtyard — for two hours.

Before his solo march, he shined his shoes and his brass "as if my life depended on it." He said he got the same "feeling of adrenaline" that he got under fire in Afghanistan.

"The area ... it's almost like death," said the six-foot-tall teen-ager with black hair.

Since the incident, upperclassmen have nicknamed him "Do-What-You-Want Zikria."

Loosely Structured Life

"Cadets have to learn to take orders, to study, to be soldiers," said Officer Wear. "It's a long one-year

process and Zeek has just started out."

Cadet Zikria was born in the United States and spent six years in Afghanistan as a child. It is not uncommon for Afghans in their 20's and 30's to have settled in the United States to return briefly to fight in Afghanistan, but few teen-agers have done so. Cadet Zikria joined the guerrillas during the summer after his junior year in high school, attracted by the adventure, the excitement and the belief that the guerrillas were fighting for a just cause. His parents are related to the leaders of two moderate guerrilla groups.

He went as a translator for Western journalists but was handed a gun and also fought alongside the guerrillas. He went on a monthlong series of hit-and-run operations against Soviet posts. He spent a month on a reconnaissance mission to gauge the enemy's troop movements.

Life, he said, was loosely structured around prayer five times a day. Before attacks, the guerrillas gathered around the commander and shouted battle cries.


Unimaginable War

There was occasional sloppiness. "We were huddled on top of a ridge attacking a post," Cadet Zikria recalled. Unexpectedly, mortar rounds slammed into their position from behind. "No one knew about this Soviet post," he said. "Everyone scattered, haphazardly running for cover. The attack was aborted."

His classmates frequently ask him whether he ever killed anybody. "I was shot at and I shot at people," he said, but he does not know whether he killed anyone.

He said war is unimaginable. To survive, he said, he learned to conquer fear and panic.

"War is like a fog," he said. "Most of the time, you're trying to figure out what's going on."



Yama Zikria

Jean-Pierre Hocké

Quits

Allegedly he used the Danish contribution to fund set up by Nordic countries for refugee education to pay for entertainment & 1st class air travel



UNITED NATIONS, Oct. 26 — The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has resigned in a scandal over allegations that he misused agency money to pay for entertainment and first-class air travel for himself and his wife, officials said today.

Mr. Hocké spent between \$32,000 and \$96,000 a year from Denmark's contribution on his entertainment and travel without informing the Danish Government or asking its permission. • • •

Gerald Hinteregger was named Acting High Commissioner.

In a letter to Mr. Pérez de Cuellar, Mr. Hocké said he and his organization had become the object of "anonymous and public attacks." In the last two years, he called the attacks a "grave assault on the High Commission for Refugees as a whole" and said they had crippled my capacity to fulfill fully my principal responsibility toward refugees in need."

NYT 10/27

BIA on 10/12 was pleased that the well-known US politician "Kaliber Pill" [a.k.a. Claiborne Pell] was in favor of a peaceful solution of the Afghan issue.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

"Afghanistan: The Trajectory of Int'l Alignments" by Robert Canfield in MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL 43, #4, Autumn 1989.

Forthcoming articles by Barnett Rubin: "Afghanistan Since the Geneva Accords" in the December 1989 issue of CURRENT HISTORY; "Afghanistan: The Fragmentation of a State and Chances for Reconstruction" in the Winter 89-90 issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Zalmay Khalilzad will also have an article in the December issue of CURRENT HISTORY. US policy towards South Asia will be the topic.

LE SUICIDE ET LE CHANT (Popular poetry of Pashtoon Women) by S.B. Majrouh, translated from the Pashto & adapted by the author & Andre Velter, Mont-de-Marsan, les Cahiers des Brisants, 1988. 65 pp. 70 Ff. ISBN 2-905395-64-8.

"Afghanistan: back to tribalism or on to Lebanon?" by Olivier Roy in THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY, October 1989. (See abstract on p.32) The publication is available from TWQ, 13th Floor, New Zealand House, 80 Haymarket, London SW1Y 4TS, United Kingdom for \$30/yr. Individual issues are \$9 + \$1.50 postage & handling.

THE LAND AND PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN by Mary Louise Clifford in the Portraits of the Nations Series, J.B. Lippincott, New York, 1989. [We haven't seen this one but we think it's a reprint or a rewrite of the 1973 update of the book originally published in 1962.]

"Nomadic Pastoralists & Sedentary Hosts in the Central & Western Hindukush Mountains, Afghanistan" by Daniel Balland in HUMAN IMPACT ON MOUNTAINS, edited by Nigel Allen, Gregory Knapp & Christoph Stadel, Rowman & Littlefield, Totowa, NJ, 1988. Pp 265-291.

Balland also contributed an article on "Le déclin contemporain du nomadisme pastoral en Afghanistan" in NEUE BEITRÄGE ZUR AFGHANISTANFORSCHUNG, edited by E. Grötzbach, Schriftenreihe der Stiftung Bibliotheca Afghanica, Bd. 6, Liestal, 1988. Pp. 175-198.

"Why Are We in Afghanistan?" by Robert Wright in THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 4, 1989.

LE GUIDE DE L'AFGHANISTAN by Bernard Dupaigne & Gilles Rossignol, Lyon, Ed. La Manufacture, 1989. 150 Ff.

"Afghanistan: The Last Thirty Years," papers from a November 1988 Paris conference, appeared in CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY, Vol 7, nos. 2/3, 1988.

THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: AN ACCOUNT & ANALYSIS OF THE COUNTRY, ITS PEOPLE, SOVIET INTERVENTION & THE RESISTANCE by Olivier Roy & Andre Brigot, transl. by Mary & Tom Bottomore, London, Simon & Schuster, 1988. 155 pp. £7.95.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan & internal affairs relating to India, Pakistan & Afghanistan from the early 1980s are discussed in the final 3 chapters of DAS ERBE DER GROSSMOGULN: VOLKERSCHICKSALE ZWISCHEN HINDUKUSCH & GOLF VON BENGALEN by Hans Walter Berg, Hamburg, Hoffman & Campe, 1988. 336 pp. DM 38.

Issue number 11, Summer 1989, is the last one of AFGHANISTAN a Quarterly Magazine published by the Afghanistan Information Office, 290-292 Pentonville Road, London N1 9NR. The issue contained the following articles: "Descent into chaos" by Julian Gearing, "The Jihad's last gasp?" by Ian MacWilliam, "The folly of Jalalabad & a choice for the West" by Guy Brailsford, "The Russian exit from Afghanistan" by Richard Pipes, "Kabul's Winter Soldiers" by David Isby, "Wahabis in Afghanistan" by Tim Weaver, "Human Rights for the Afghans" by Anthony Hyman, "The Province of Badghis" by Bruce Wannell, "Working Together" by Peter Marsden, & "The BBC & Afghanistan" by Gordon Adam. The publication was edited by Julian Gearing. It was a good one & we shall miss it.

The resources of the Afghanistan Information office will still be available for journalists & other interested individuals from Afghanaid at the address listed above.

Publications issued by the ROA Senate: "History of Councils of Afghanistan" by Abdullah Mehraban, & "Nat'l Deliberance & Gaining of Independence."

CASSETTES

AFGHANISTAN - THE UNTOLD STORY explains the origins, causes & consequences of the Afghan war & captures 2 decades of history in a VHF, slide/tape video (18 minutes). It is available from Afghan-aid, 1st Floor, 290-292 Pentonville Rd., London N1 9NR, Great Britain, for £7.50 plus postage & handling (82p in the UK.).

MUSIC OF AFGHANISTAN by Shah Wali Taranasaz will be available in December on an audio cassette from the World Music Institute, 109 West 27th Street, Rm 9C, New York, NY 10001, for \$10.

Vol. 1, #2 of THE AFGHANISTAN STUDIES JOURNAL, edited by Grant Farr, contains articles about & by Louis Dupree, articles on women, health care & primary education & an historical photo section. The JOURNAL would like photos of places & people with historical significance for Afghanistan for possible future publication. If you'd like to share your photographs, contact the Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE 68182. Subscriptions to the JOURNAL are \$10/yr (two issues).

ABSTRACTS

AFGHANISTAN: EXILES IN SEARCH OF A STATE. by Barnett Rubin. This paper was part of a panel on governments in exile presented at the American Political Science Assn's annual meeting in Atlanta, Aug 31 - Sept. 3, 1989.

Effective control of state power in Afghanistan has always depended on access to resources outside the territory of the state. This, together with the divisiveness of the tribal social structure, is a reason that in the past prominent exiles from the royal family have been able to return and assume power after a war or revolt they did not lead or start, for example, Dost Moh'd Khan, Abd-ur-Rahman Khan & Nader Shah. None of these, however, formed a government in exile. The Peshawar alliance and its Pakistani and Saudi backers hoped that by forming an "interim government," this group of exiles could similarly take power in Kabul. But this has not occurred. The main reason is that these leaders, unlike past exiles from the royal family, have been unable to gain the support of the various groups of fighters (mujahedin) inside the country, despite the nominal allegiance of most of the latter to the Peshawar parties.

AFGHANISTAN: BACK TO TRIBALISM OR ON TO LEBANON? by Olivier Roy. This article appeared in the October 1989 issue of the THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY.

Following Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan will not simply revert to the traditional tribal politics of the pre-war period. The war entailed a politicization of traditional society; there are now political parties inside Afghanistan, even if these parties express to a certain extent a traditional segmentation. The war brought also a new leadership, which is altering the secular tribal structures. Ethnic identities took a new shape through the process of war. The influence of the Pashtun has diminished: the war has had the effect of strengthening the self-assertion of other ethnic groups, especially the Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. On the other hand, the traditional segmentation of the society has not disappeared and is now expressing itself through the new political structures, including political parties. The mujahedin have never been able to replace a traditional structure by a modern political one.

The war brought considerable social changes. Afghanistan, which was an overwhelmingly rural society, has undergone a process of urbanization through internal migrations and through emigration outside the country. The divisions which have developed have been exacerbated by the influence of Pakistan, the USSR and Iran, each country playing both ideological and ethnic cards.

The provisional mujahidin gov't established in February is not a credible political alternative. The future of Afghanistan lies in the hands of the big mujahidin field commanders.

THE KABUL TIMES

ESTABLISHED 1919

Disabled children flown to FRG for treatment

KABUL, JULY 18, (BIA) On the basis of a joint cooperation protocol between the Afghan Red Crescent Society and the Peace Village Association of FRG, the fourth group of disabled children flew yesterday to that country.


The group consisting of 20 children, went to FRG for treatment along with the delegation of the Peace Village.

A source of ARCS said that according to the protocol, the teenagers who have been disabled as a result of war and whose treatment is not possible inside the country, are sent to FRG. So

far a total number of 86 children have been sent in three groups to FRG, out of whom 25 have returned back home after the treatment and recovery.

The source added, that under the agreement concluded between the ARCS and the PVA of FRG, the construction work of an orthopedic center for disabled children will soon begin in Kabul with the monetary and technical assistance of PVA. With the completion of this surgery center the disabled children will be treated and cured inside the country.

7/19



The monument of unknown soldiers in Kabul city.

Faculty of Engineering conducts 1st semester exam

The examination of the first academic semester of the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Kabul, after its rehabilitation has started on August 26.

The examination of the first academic semester has also started in all Faculties of the University of Kabul.

The Faculty of Engineering after a long time elapse will offer skillful graduates in different technical and engineering fields like before at high standards.

In an interview associate professor Dr. Attak Mohammad Nazar, dean of the Faculty of Engineering said about the teaching methods and the preparation of the students "for the examination". This year, the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Kabul after a seven-year elapse was rehabilitated due to the request of a number of students and professors of the University of Kabul in accordance with the resolution

of the Council of Ministers of the RA. More than 200 young students were enrolled at the start of the first semester. The Faculty has started with the similar programme and syllabus as before. The departments of Civil Engineering, Architecture, Mechanical Engineering and electricity have been rehabilitated and the students follow the courses in general in the first three semesters.

They will be classified to different departments according to their own interest in the second semester of the second academic year. There are 20 academic staff in the Faculty of Engineering who are also teaching in the Faculties of Natural Sciences and Geo-Sciences as well. The Faculty is faced with lack of laboratory equipments and technical engineering equipments is seriously ne-

ded. We are in contact to solve this deficiency with the help of the Ministry of Higher and Vocational Education and Kabul University. We will also be looking forward for help from the international organisation not to spare their cooperation as before, with the Faculty of Engineering Attaq Mohammad Nazar added.

The standard of this Faculty before it was closed was very high. Therefore, with due consideration of the previous standards of this Faculty, it is rehabilitated and we shall try to train the students at that level.

The students who have enrolled this year are mainly boys they are very much attentive and interested to attend their classes. The students were anxiously waiting to attend their classes during the University vacation. Among the 214 students enrolled at the Faculty 202 students

are eligible for the final semester exam which will last for three weeks, and at the end, the second semester will begin. We will continue our courses, but the only way of students success depends upon their endeavour. Continuous following of the classes, lack of absence, observing discipline and constantly working will be the only way of their success. Fortunately our students are keen in observing the regulation of the Faculty in this semester, which was admired by the rector of the University of Kabul and professors and staff.



Dr. Attak Mohammad Nazar.

and could follow the classes.

Daily class work is a good method which directs the students towards success. As it was decided at the beginning of the semester we did not admit those students who are not interested to attend their classes.

9/5

Our students are highly interested in attending their classes regularly they are intelligent students

This semester, we are in fact all satisfied. If we can follow this process that we have started this year, we will definitely be able to offer outstanding engineers in various fields of engineering in near future.

A folkloric typicalism in Afghan living

Abdul was born in a well-known body with red cheeks blue eyes in a poor family in a dark period of our country in one of the old districts of Kabul city called Shor Bazar. From his early age he stood in such a condition to show the people and his neighbours the way of his work, ability and how to spend the day in his father's shop near the furnace in hot and cold days. The smith's forge having much heat in summer days. His father as an iron smith was a tough and harsh man. Days and nights from dawn to dusk he intended to work and make shovels, hatchets, hammers, axes, chains sickles, picks, frying pans (for cooking bread), ...etc.

Abdul was pounding, beating and melted and heated metals on anvil to give it shape. There was a carpenter's shop by the name of Sufi Samad, who was usually looking to iron smith's shop meaningfully. After selling an axe or a pick, the buyer was customarily going to the carpenter's shop as per explanation of the iron smith in order to put a

helve in his pick, or ab-

To some of the people as the shopkeepers this business looks some how rather wonderful and strange things. The father of Abdul was a harsh warden. Abdul who later became Kaka Abdul (Uncle) suffered the pangs of hunger and burning forge in the shop. He was always busy. Each and every day his customers were amazed at his tolerance and at his strength. Days and nights, weeks, months and years have been passing. When he grew up and was young enough, his father decided to engage him with a girl, one of his relatives by the name of Fatema.

In the meantime Abdul

was a staunch supporter

of his father and as a co-

worker in his shop, was

always busy.

After elapsing of years the time of the wedding approached and one day one of the relatives who was a bread seller informed Abdul in his shop to organize everything and make arra-

ngements to purchase jewellery and other essential materials for the wedding and too, submit the cash amount to the father of the bride which was promised prior to the engagement.

During these periods Abdul was very fond and eager to visit his fiancee and repeatedly requested his father to do so. But his father refused his requests. Once Abdul was very busy in a hot afternoon of a summer day beating a heated iron with a heavy hammer in his shop, the sister of his fiancee came and brought a note in which she wrote:

"We were engaged for the last three years and so far you are unable to arrange the items ordered by my father for the wedding. If you live in anonymity and carelessness, my father will take a decision."

Abdul kept the note and late at night when all members of the family were present, Abdul handed over with great respect the note to his father. His fat-

her promised to provide everything for a wedding ceremony.

Abdul was quite young and handsome, too. Fatema was the most beautiful girl in that district, the fame and news of her beauty was spreading day-by-day in the neighbourhoods. Abdul was amazed and did not know what to do. Latey he decided to respond the note of his fiancee, and wrote:

"With due respect I kindly request you dear if you please let me be busy with my job in the shop, because at present we can not meet all the expenses of the wedding and do not bear to manage and supply the items ordered by your father prior to our engagement. In order to gain enough money to enable me to provide all the basic things for the marriage, within more seven months, next spring I will arrange for the wedding. At the foot of his note he wrote the following poem reads as:

My fiancee was not aware of her beauty The offspring of the one who made the "mirror should be broken".
(Abdul Nazari)

Over 6,000
youth volunteer
to military
service


From July 10, over 700 youth in Baghlan have voluntarily enlisted in the provincial military commissariat and were dispatched to the units and detachments of the armed forces.

Similarly from April 10, 5560 youth of Laghman province have been registered in the military commissariat of the province and rushed to the ranks of the armed forces. Some of those registered were liable for recruitment.

7/20



A view of Darul Aman palace in Kabul.



Official Gazette publishes 2 more decrees

KABUL, JULY 30. (BIA) No. 314 and dated May 15, 1989 decree of President Najibullah on the modification of the article 9 of the decree No 326 dated March 5.1989 pertaining to the return of the properties of repatriates, regulations for arranging the duties and performances of the Ministry of Civil Aviation of the Republic of Afghanistan and regulations on the conditions and granting of extra leave for patients were published in

the issue No 692 dated June 15, 1989 of the official gazette.

Similarly the law of insurance, regulations for the archive department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, addenda No 1 on the classification fixing and promotion of the ranks of workers, civil servants and contracted employees were published in the issue No 694 dated June 21, 1989 of the official gazette.

New Afghan feature film screened

To welcome the 70th anniversary of the independence of the country a newly-produced feature film of the Afghan Film Institute entitled the Trip was put on show recently in Zainab Nindari cinema of Kabul.

At the inaugural ceremony of the film present were Shafiq Wadjan deputy head of the Propaganda and Cultural Department of the Central Committee of the PDPA, Sayed Yaqub Wasiq head of the Radio-TV and Cinematography Department of Afghanistan, actors and actresses of the film and a large number of the cinema art fans.

At the outset of the ceremony Sayed Yaqub Wasiq talked on the marvellous achievements of the workers of the cinema of the country and underlined the existing problems and shortcomings in this sphere.

He appreciated the painstaking and hard work of the producer of the film and wished him further successes in his accomplishments.

Afterwards Engineer Latif head of the Afghan Film Institute and Engineer Haider Pardis chairman of the Artists Union of Afghanistan respectively extolled the meritorious works of the cinema experts of the country in upgrading the level of this art in Afghanistan and explained the importance of the objective realities of our society.

Saeed Wurkzai the

producer of this feature film was warmly welcomed by continuous applaus of the participants of the function. He talked on the film and on behalf of other artists of the country vowed all round devotion for producing more meritorious films and enhancing the quality of the cinema of the country.


At the end of the session as per the decree of esteemed Najibullah President of the Republic of Afghanistan, the order of Red Banner of the Republic of Afghanistan was conferred by the deputy head of the Propaganda and Cultural Department of the CO PDPA to the producer of the film to appreciate his valuable works.

In order to familiarize our readers with this feature film of the Afghan Film Institute, which was shown in Zainab Nindari Cinema, our correspondent had an interview with the talented producer of this film. Saeed Wurkzai. An excerpt of this interview is presented here under:

Replies to a question regarding to the commencement of the work for the production of the artistic film of the Trip, Saeed Wurkzai said:

Shots of this feature film commenced on Saur the 8th, 1368 H.S. by Sonel Dath the well-known cinema artist of India during his stay in the Republic of Afghanistan.

This film is depicting the painstaking and sorrowful realities of the



Saeed Wurkzai

Afghan society, that are being created by the vicious enemy of our country.

The script of this film explains the courage and militancy, and gallantry committed by Afghan youth, who despite the continuation of the undeclared war in our country, with full awareness and patriotic feelings rush to the help of the rural compatriots and make them literate and fulfil their patriotic tasks against the mother land.

The script of this film is inspired by the calamities and miseries that have been created in our society by the savage undeclared war, a war that has been unleashed against our country and against our innocent people for a decade and has brought about nothing else but tears, blood and destruction to our people.

The film starts with the dawn of the Sun and flying of a helicopter. Simultaneously with th-

ese, the true sons of the country also move towards light and propagating knowledge.

This film is demonstrating vehement and complicated hardships numerous ups and downs of the life which are intimidating in each and every moment the preludes of light and humanism.

Despite all these hardships and hindrances, the zealous youth of the country fearlessly pursuing their path and taking bold strides towards the achievement of their patriotic goals.

In this film we see a part of the bitter realities of our society that is the tragic event of a father fighting his son.

Saeed Wurkzai answering a question that whether he was faced with difficulties or not during making shot of the film said:

"While I was producing the film, during each and every shot of the film I was faced with difficulties and problems, because most of the actors and actresses of the film were the newly-emerged ones in the art of our cinema, and this was the beginning of their artistic work in the cinema sphere and they were not fully familiarized with the relevant techniques of film shooting."

Saeed Wurkzai the talented film producer of Afghanistan answering to the question of employing newly-emerged film actors and actresses in his film and of the outcome of his work he said:

"I employed the newly-emerged actors and actresses in my film based on two reasons. Firstly I have confidence on my own merits and ability that I can direct my actors as I wish, and secondly by employing new stars in my films I have the idea to offer more and more film stars to my people and pave the ground for the further promotion of the new stars and encourage them in this sphere."

However, at the beginning this choice was a risk but I accepted and performed successfully. On the other hand these new stars such as Farida, Lisa and others are very talented actresses at the same time also courageous, principled and enthusiastic ones, and they have much interest in their works.

Such brilliant characteristics of my stars made me able to emerge successfully from the work and I am fully confident with the starring of my actors and actresses in the film.

Wurkzai underlined that when I myself saw the film it inspired hopes in me and encouraged me to follow my work in the future too.

This year, too, I have the plan to produce another film. I have already finished the scenario of this film and have chosen the stars but I refrain to disclose the title of the film and the name of the stars till the work begins.

(BAHARAT) 8/20

Touryalay

Shafiq laid to rest

KABUL, MAY 11. (BIA)
Touryalay Shafiq one of the cinema founders of the country died yesterday of a sickness at the age of 48 years (peace be upon him).



Touryalay Shafiq

Tarzi seminar held in Kabul

KABUL, AUG 6. (BIA)

After the message of President Najibullah was presented, the first seminar to commemorate the great scientific, literary and journalistic personality of Alama Mahmud Tarzi was opened in the capital on Saturday in keeping with the national policy of the Republic of Afghanistan

and in honour of the 70th anniversary of independence.

Verses from the Holy Quran were recited at the outset of the seminar sponsored by the Journalists' Union in the latter's headquarters in line with the programme of the National Commission for

Celebrating the 70th Independence Anniversary.

Decree on conferring medals enforced

KABUL, (BIA)

President Najibullah has issued as per the article (75.15) of the constitution of the Republic of Afghanistan the following decree on granting medals for commemorating the 70th anniversary of the independence of the country:

Article 1:

Medals for the 70th anniversary of the independence of the Republic of Afghanistan shall be conferred to the following state employees, national and social figures and those compatriots who had displayed heroism in defending the independence, territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the country.

1. For high ranking officials including vice presidents, members of the supreme council for the

defence of homeland, members of the national assembly members of the cabinet, chief justice and members of the supreme court, members of the constitutional council and attorney general and its deputies

2. To those citizens of the Republic of Afghanistan who won the titles of the hero and work hero of the Republic of Afghanistan.

3. To those officers of the Republic of Afghanistan who have served for 20 years in the armed forces of the Republic of Afghanistan.

4. To those officers of the armed forces of the Republic of Afghanistan who have served for ten years in the combat units

of the armed forces.

5. To all crews of civil and military aviation.

6. To those armed civil forces, tribal units, militia, revolutionary soldiers and self defence groups who have displayed heroism in discharging their duties in defending the homeland.

7. To all opposition field commanders who joined under national reconciliation policy with the government of the Republic of Afghanistan.

8. To those soldiers who have voluntarily served for five years in the ranks of the armed forces of the Republic of Afghanistan.

9. To those outstanding workers and service personnel of the organs of

the armed forces of the Republic of Afghanistan who have served for over five years.

10. To the members of the national preparatory commission for the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the independence of the Republic of Afghanistan.

11. To all generals including retired generals

12. To the following employees of state, political parties and social organisations who are citizens of the Republic of Afghanistan.

To those who are introduced by the secretariat of the commission for national reconciliation and have played a significant role in the realization of the national reconciliation policy and ensuring peace in the country.

To those ulama and clergymen who are introduced through the high council of ulama and clergymen of the Republic of Afghanistan.

To those state employees out of rank.

To those outstanding employees of the state, social organisations and political parties who are introduced by their related organs and organisations.

To those who are introduced through their related organs and who have shown initiatives in socio-economic spheres and discharged honestly their duties

To all academicians and professors.

To those outstanding teachers and instructors who are introduced through their related institutions.

To those outstanding women who have rendered valuable services in socio-economic and cultural spheres and defending the country and are introduced through All Afghan Women Council.

To those outstanding women who have rendered valuable services in socio-economic and cultural spheres and defending the country and are introduced through All Afghan Women Council.

13. To those foreign citizens who had served in the consolidation of the international stand of the Republic of Afghanistan.

Article 2:

The presidential Office is duty bound to fix the number of medals for every organ and organisation and submit them to the concerned sources till Aug 7, 1989.

Article 3:

1—A Commission for the implementation of this decree should be set up in the Council of Ministers, ministers, organs of the armed forces, national front, political parties and social organisations.

2—Regarding article 1 of this decree the commissions are duty bound to organise the distribution of medals for deserving persons.

3—The commissions are assigned to pay keen attention to determining the deserving persons and confer only one medal for one deserving person.

Najibullah
President of the Republic of Afghanistan 8/8

senator selected

KABUL AUG 29. (BIA)

Presidential office reports that under para second, Article 79 of the Constitution, President Najibullah has selected Mohammad Rasoul Kargar, s/o Mohammad Yasin as a senator in National Assembly of the Republic of Afghanistan.



Blood donation

Some employees of the ministry of frontier affairs have donated yester-

day their 4500 cc blood to the central blood bank to help the people injured in the rocket shelling fired by the extremists in Kabul city.

Likewise, employees and workers of Hoechst Company have donated

their 11000 cc blood to the academy of medical sciences of the armed forces.

To assist the valorous and heroic people of Khost Division who are fighting with stanchness against the aggression of Pak militarists, Saudi

Wahabis and the extremists, the employees of Sali Pol provincial party committee have donated their one day salary to account No. 50013 of De Afghanistan Bank.

CHRONOLOGY

7/28 - KT - Dr. Mehr Moh'd Ajazi was named ROA Minister of Vocational & Higher Education.

8/9 - KT - The first issue of "Life & Law," a quarterly journal of the ROA Lawyers Assn. appeared recently. The issue, edited by Tela Pamir, has 80 pages.

8/13 - KT - Ustad Ghulam Nabi Natu, a musician, died recently. "In the reign of Amir Amanullah Khan he had taught music to the students of Habibia High School."

8/14 - PT - Canada will give \$14m in food aid to Pakistan for Afghan refugees.

- SCMP - The USSR may send the ROA new weapons, including MiG-29 war planes, if the US sends new arms to the guerrillas.

8/17 - Hong Kong Standard - Interim gov't prime minister Sayyaf announced that guerrillas fighting in different parts of Afghanistan will soon be placed under a unified command for better results.



8/19 - PT - Pravda reported that 14,000 Soviets were killed in the Afghan war. The figure includes the 330 who are "missing." 1984 was the bloodiest year - 2,300 Soviet servicemen died.

8/21 - SCMP - ROA authorities expressed regret to the French Gov't over the death of Vincent Gernigon (see last issue, p. 8). They detained another French aid worker, Henri-Xavier Lemire (see 5/15).

- LAT - A picture of ROA defector Zarif who was in charge of Najibullah's personal security force. (See p. 8 of the last issue for details.)



8/22 - KT - Najibullah appointed Wakil Nezamuddin to the ROA Senate.



8/23 - KT - Moh'd Hakim (left) was named a Deputy Prime Minister. Abdul Karim Misaq was appointed Mayor of Kabul.

- PT - The World Bank has cut off loans to Afghanistan because the ROA has paid nothing on its old loans for 6 months. Its old debts amount to \$79.2m.

- US Sen. Claiborne [sic] Pell told refugees at the Nasir Bagh camp that US assistance & support would continue until the refugees' "dignified return" to their country.

- WSJ - In his most recent outline for ways to end the Afghan war, Najibullah dropped his previous insistence on a cease-fire before any talks.

- SCMP - Gen. Abdul Haq Ulumi, Sec'y of the ROA Supreme Defense Council, said the US was supplying a new type of rocket to the rebels.

The new rockets explode in midair, scattering between 26 and 30 different kinds of bombs, he said.

One bomb explodes scattering pieces that kill people, another drops bombs on the ground that explode when touched, and the third burrows about 30 centimetres into the ground and is detonated like a mine when

stepped on. General Ulumi said:

"It kills everybody with in 430 square feet," he added.

General Ulumi said that the US and Britain started producing the rockets in 1986. He said military experts were working to identify their exact type.

8/27 - PT - UN Sec'y Gen'l de Cuellar plans to confer with Pakistani & Kabul regime delegates at the Non-Aligned Nations summit in Belgrade in September to help promote an Afghan settlement.

8/28 - PT - Syed Yaqub Agha, "Amir of Jamaat Islami Afghanistan," was murdered in Quetta yesterday.

8/29 - LAT - An official of Gulbuddin's party accused Jamaat-i-Islami (Rabbani) of launching a massive attack on one of Hizb's bases in Takhar. The 3-week conflict left 300 dead.

8/30 - SCMP - Gulbuddin resigned from the interim gov't, protesting the group's failure to hold elections.

8/30 - PT - A Pakistani official said there had been a constant decline in foreign assistance for Afghan refugees since the Soviet pullout, & that the number of refugees had increased due to intensified fighting in Afghanistan.

8/31 - HK Standard - Peshawar gov't-in-exile leaders met to discuss ways of healing rifts & to try to persuade Gulbuddin to change his mind about participating in the gov't.

- Guerrillas launched a major offensive in Khost last week. Medical sources said that 50-60 casualties/day were reaching Peshawar from the Khost area.

9/1 - HK Std - Guerrillas captured an ROA post at Duragi, 22 km southeast of Khost. Five smaller posts around Khost were captured Tuesday (see 9/9). - AfghaNews (Jamiat) - Sayed Jamal, the alleged perpetrator of the Farkhar massacre, was arrested by Jamiat on 8/18

9/2 - According to the Washington Post the US CIA has removed the head of its Afghan Task Force following Congressional criticism of the handling of the covert arms program for Afghanistan. [We saw a news service summary of the article, not the actual piece. A related item appears on p. 13 Ed.]

- PT - UN Sec'y Gen'l de Cuellar said he does not believe that any formula for solving the Afghan problem emanating from the 2 superpowers would be a "good idea" at this stage. However, he thinks that Washington & Moscow could make an important contribution by persuading all the Afghan factions to enter into a dialogue. He is pessimistic on the Soviet proposal for an int'l peace conference: "I am not against the idea but I'm not very optimistic about its chances." His own choice? "My preference is the idea which works."

9/3 - LA Daily News - Guerrilla rocket attacks on Kabul airport & the main bazaar killed as many as 46 people & closed the airport to civilian traffic. - LAT - The US & Pakistan have cut money & supplies to the 7-party alliance & are attempting to deliver the material directly to commanders inside Afghanistan. The hope is to encourage

the growth of regional power centers, as well as to reduce the influence of extreme fundamentalists, particularly Gulbuddin. Some Afghans are skeptical about the success of the new approach as the Peshawar parties provide depots & transportation for the weapons.



9/4 - LAT - In response to Peter Tomsen's charge last week that at least 300 Soviets were helping the Kabul regime, The ROA Gov't said there are no Soviet advisers in the country. "The Afghanistan armed forces enjoy sufficient experience & morale to defend the country." (Peter Tomsen is the US envoy to the interim gov't in Peshawar.) (See 10/14)

- PT - Mujaddidi asked the Non-Aligned Movement to seat the Afghan interim gov't at the NAM summit in Belgrade.

- The Soviet Congress of People's Deputies has formed a special commission to inquire into the reasons behind the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The commission is to submit its report at the next meeting of the Congress in Oct. 1990.

9/5 - BIA - At the ROA Council of Ministers meeting it was noted that the Gov't has taken measures to provide Kabul citizens with agricultural products. Work continues on the poultry projects in Badambagh & Bagrami, the Rishkor milch cow project, the Darulaman bee project & the Qargha fish project. Incentive funds have been allotted for drivers of cargo vehicles.

9/6 - HK Std - At the Non-Aligned Nations summit in Belgrade, Iranian delegates disrupted the discussions on the future of

Afghanistan by insisting that the country be described as "Islamic Afghanistan," which didn't sit well with the ROA & India. (See p. 14)

9/6 - BIA - The ROA recently reopened the Faculty of Engineering. Dean Atta Moh'd Nazar oversees the 26 staff members & 214 students. (See p. 33) - The Kabul bread silo, which opened in 1955, produces 12 tons of bread every 24 hours & employs 1,305 people.

9/8 - SCMP - An ROA official said that much of Afghanistan is ruled by rebel commanders & the Gov't is trying to make deals with them.

"Right now (rebel) field commanders have autonomy in their regions. It is a fait accompli," said Mr Najmuddin Kawayani, secretary of the central committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.



Najmuddin Kawayani

9/9 - Washington Post - The Bush Adm. sent a senior diplomat to talk with ex-King Zahir Shah on what role he might play in a political settlement in Afghanistan.

The official said the administration now wants to broaden its direct contacts with both the internal Afghan guerrillas and outside Afghan opposition figures such as the king and other political exiles in an effort to breathe life into the Afghan Interim Government (AIG).

The king "could decide this group has potential and the best thing he

could do for them, himself and Afghanistan is throw in his weight behind it," said the official.

"Or he could reach the opposite conclusion that it has no potential for legitimacy and the best thing he could do is to set up an alternative," he added. "It's our first contact in quite a while. We'll see how it goes and what comes of it."

9/10 - Washington Post - In an interview with Lally Weymouth, the ex-King said he is ready to go home & help lead a new interim gov't.

Zahir Shah indicated he would support Najibullah's ouster as part of a new coalition government. "Under the present conditions," he said, "the Afghan nation has sacrificed more than one million dead and the country has been destroyed. Why did they accept all this sacrifice? It was their rejection of an imposed regime, which went against their ideology. After 10 years, how is it possible to share power and sit together [with the Soviet-backed leadership]. At present, it would not be feasible to see these [Soviet-backed] elements sharing power."

The first step toward a new and more stable government, he said, would be to hold a *Loya Jirga*, the traditional Afghan assembly of tribal notables, which he called the highest political authority in the Afghan tradition. "I am ready to participate in such an initiative," Zahir Shah said. Although the king traditionally called such assemblies, Zahir Shah said that the former king he wouldn't issue such a call by himself. "It must be done by a group of [Afghan notables], of which I am a part." * * *

9/9 - SCMP - The ROA says it has won the battle for Khost after retaking key positions around the town. Gen. Abdul Haq Olomi confirmed reports that Kabul had received MiG-29 & Sukhoi-27 fighter jets from Moscow. "We have them. They are at our disposal. But it has not been necessary to use them yet."

9/10 - BIA - Soviet Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov ended his tour of duty in Afghanistan.

9/12 - NYT - The Bush Adm. proposed a reduction in the number of refugees who could be admitted to the US from the Near East & South Asia from 7,000 (1989) to 6,500 (1990).

9/13 - BIA - ROA Gov't workers receive 10,000 tons of subsidized flour/month.

- A training seminar on drug addicts & alcohol for 180 principals & vice principals of Kabul City schools began today.

- PT - Khan Abdul Wali Khan, chief of Pakistan's Awami Nat'l Party, offered his party's services to mediate an Afghan settlement. He announced the establishment of a "Peace Committee," headquartered in Peshawar with offices in Quetta & other cities.

9/14 - PT - Pakistani Army chief, Gen. Mir Aslam Beg, said yesterday that the mujahideen should open talks with the communists if Najibullah stepped down. He said the solution should be left to the Afghan people.

Gen. Beg said that solution of the Afghan problem should be left to the Afghan people. No option devised by outside forces will work in Afghanistan because the Afghan people themselves should be permitted to decide for themselves. "The recently proposed Zahir Shah option will also not work," Gen. Beg said.

"God is with the Mujahideen, and if they are allowed to decide for themselves, they will find a way out. God will not abandon them. We may abandon them. Our friends may abandon them. But they will win," he added . . .

(See also
§/17
6 p. 12)

He criticized the recent slaughter of rival resistance commanders, allegedly by Hekmatyar's men, and said that if the resistance hadn't made such mistakes, Najibullah's troops would already have defected and the war would have been won.

Asked about fundamentalist opposition to him, and their argument that the resistance groups that fought the war should gain the political fruits of victory, Zahir Shah said this: "It is natural that there are different views. But what is important is that the majority of the people decide. It is not correct to say that those so-called fundamentalists fought more . . . Most of those fighters didn't fight for a party, but to defend their faith and homeland."



The Muslim 9/16

9/15 - LAT - The ROA released Henri-Xavier Lemire, a 33-year-old French aid worker captured west of Kandahar on 8/14.


9/16 - BIA - 126 "pious compatriots" left on Ariana Airlines for Baghdad. The Afs. 55,000 fare for the pilgrims going to Karbala was paid by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs which sent a Ministry delegation with the group.

9/17 - A large food convoy reached Kandahar via Herat, Nimroz, Helmand & Farah, dropping off supplies along the way. A weapons convoy had arrived earlier.

- Felix Ermacora, Special Rapporteur for the Human Rights Commission, arrived in Kabul.

- On US contact with the ex-King, BIA quotes a Pakistani official as saying that the goal of the contact is to try to "establish a bridge between Zahir Shah & the Afghan resistance." The official said that steps "for the creation of a railway line so that wagons could go over it" should be taken to prepare the way for a political solution.

[Other comments on the subject.]

"The Afghan nation will never accept him. His fate will be the same as Najibullah's."

Gulbuddin

"Bringing Zahir Shah back instead of an Islamic gov't is an insult to the Afghan people" - Sayyaf.
"He may be stupid, but he's not that stupid!" - Anonymous

There are reports that Zahir Shah has been issued a visa for Pakistan. Ed.
(See also p. 12)



Exiled King Zahir Shah

9/17 - BIA - Najibullah met with Afghan mathematician Moh'd Sidiq Afghan at the Gulkhana Presidential Palace. The young man has created "100 inventions" in the field of mathematics & "From the theory of probability & historical table, with the assistance of high mathematics, he has proved that peace will be obtained in Afghanistan in the near future."

9/18 - PT - Mujahideen sources say that the Soviets recently delivered 2 new types of long & medium range Scud missiles to the ROA.

9/19 - BIA - The ROA Council of Ministers approved the import & sale of video cameras & recorders into Afghanistan "against the payment of import rights."

9/19 - Washington Times - Gulbuddin accused the US of betraying the resistance & wrecking his faction.

He said that Washington has started "all-out efforts, fair and unfair, to enthronize the elements of its own liking in our war-torn mother-land" . . .

"They mistakenly presume that we, Afghans, are so simple that we can't differentiate between an individual and a governmental act or omission." Mr. Hekmatyar said.

"From the very beginning, the U.S. has been exerting pressure on the Pakistan government to divide mujahideen into small and ineffective groups so that unanimous leadership did not rise and come into the lime-light," he said.

- UN Press release - Perez de Cuellar on the Afghan situation: "What is needed is the creation of a structured Afghan delegation which will represent the will of the Afghans who are not represented by the Kabul Gov't. That is why I think it is very important to have the Afghan resistance together if we want to move ahead; otherwise any effort will end in failure. I am working in that direction with my representative in the area, & in my contacts with all the parties concerned." It is up to the Afghan people to decide "if they want the King to play a role or not."

9/20 - PT - Benazir Bhutto said it would be "premature" to talk of the return of Zahir Shah. She said Pakistan would continue to support the interim gov't despite its flaws.



Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

9/20 - BIA - "Facts showed that the PDPA is now more stronger than in 1987-88."

9/21 - BIA - Najibullah indicated that 65% of the PDPA members are in the ROA armed forces. Gen'l Moisiev, Chief of Staff of the Soviet armed forces, arrived in Kabul for a working visit.
- To improve life in Kabul, a "new mechanism" has been established. According to Mayor Abdul Karim Misaq, "All those duties which were accumulated on the shoulder of the municipality have been classified in separate & identical sections...
Matters related to keeping clean the capital, placement of peddlers in specific corners of the city, control of prices & others are taken in hand." Housing & water supply are now under the "housing & city-making dept." recently established by the Council of Ministers. The most difficult problem is price control. "The high inflation rate is the result of the imperialistic undeclared war."

9/22 - PT - Mujahideen captured the provincial capital of Badghis.

9/23 - BIA commented on a Washington Post article blaming the rebel defeat at Jalalabad on the weakness of the commanders. "The Western mass medias do not touch the original & basic reasons which caused the defeat of the opposition at all... The reasons...are nothing but national fervor & the powerfulness of the armed forces of the ROA."

9/24 - BIA - Extremist rockets damaged an Ariana Boeing 727 as well as a UN plane (see 10/1).

9/25 - PT - Mujahideen in Logar have set up a joint council for better coordination between the different fighting groups.

- BIA - The ROA & the USSR signed a transportation agreement. The USSR will send new vehicles to ROA firms which must use the vehicles to transport essential goods thru-out Afghanistan.

9/26 - BIA - The DYOA & the Indian Youth Congress signed a cooperation protocol for 1989-92.

- The Council of Ministers approved a salary bonus for teachers.

- PT - Several ROA generals, belonging to the Khalq faction, reportedly held peace talks with Gulbuddin, Gailani & Massud. Kabul Radio acknowledged that a "previously unknown organization" in Kabul has made "secret proposals" to some gov't officials for ending the war.

- LAT - Guerrillas closed a critical ROA supply route near Sarobi, according to a Jamiat spokesman. The SCMP reported that the mujahideen mined the road & took 4 ROA security posts during the operation. In an attack launched on 9/11, Massood reportedly closed the Salang Highway.

9/27 - BIA - The ROA army in Balkh has a reserve unit equipped with a "different kind of light & heavy weapons & the unit is ready to participate in war in any part of the country."

9/28 - NY Post - Rather unbelievable? (See pp. 21, 22)

DAILY NEWS

Friday, October 6, 1989



9/28 - PT - Rockets hit a power station on the Kabul River near Pul-i-Charkhi prison causing a 20-hour outage to over a quarter of the population of Kabul City.

- BIA quoted BBC which was quoting the Times of London that Gulbuddin runs the world's largest heroin factory. Supposedly he started the operation several years ago, with the help of the American mafia, to finance the war. The same source said the annual production of mujahid drug factories is 800 tons/year. [A later BIA report said the plant was in Rabat near the Iranian border.]

- ROA prisons president, Maj. Gen. Moh'd Atmar, reported that "the situation of prisons, educational affairs & visits with prisoners has been improved." There are better water systems & libraries in ROA prisons.

- ROA Defense Minister Shah Nawaz Tanai said security was maintained on the Kabul-Jalalabad, Kabul-Hairatan & Kandahar-Torghondi highways.

9/29 - NYT - ROA Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil, addressing the UNGA, said that the US-backed guerrillas had lost any chance of winning a military victory against the ROA. He invited Pres. Bush to send an envoy to discuss a political settlement, saying his gov't now favors "a democratic

system based on political pluralism & a free economy." He added that rocket attacks on Kabul had killed 671 people & wounded 1,014 between 2/15 & 8/31.

- PT - An Afghan Gov't MI 8 helicopter crashed north of Kabul killing 26. "Technical reasons" caused the crash.



Abdul Wakil

Associated Press

9/30 - BIA - The Soviets will transfer 20,000 tons of fuel/month from Hairatan to Kabul, help the ROA complete the Kabul-Bagram & Kabul-Charikar roads & help "reactivate" the Salang tunnel.

- Elections began today at Kabul Univ. & the Polytechnic Inst. for department heads & for seats on the Scientific Council of the Faculties. 144 candidates are vying for 58 departments at Kabul U. 122 will be elected & over 400 people are voting (see 10/2).

- PT - Mujahideen delegates to a seminar on Afghanistan in Tehran include Sayyaf, & Mujadaddi. Gulbuddin was invited but he is inside Afghanistan. A number of Shia leaders, mostly from Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh Jafria, will accompany the 130-member group. (See 10/1)

10/1 - PT - The delegation to Tehran boiled down to 87, including Rabbani.

- Afghanews - A UN plane was damaged at Kabul airport by rockets on 9/14. Benon Sevan, the Sec'y Gen'l's special representative, was on the plane but was not hurt.

- BIA - Since 1/1/86, over 221,000 Afghan refugees have returned home from India, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia & other countries.

10/2 - BIA - Moh'd Taher Enayat was elected Rector of Kabul Univ.; Moh'd Anwar Shams was chosen Rector of Kabul Polytechnic.

- Construction began on the rehabilitation & rural development complex in the Dehsabz district of Kabul. The Afs. 63m project will include poultry farms, health & veterinary clinics, food storage facilities, a library, agricultural cooperatives & technical workshops.

- The Soviet share in Operation Salam has reached 100 rubles.

10/3 - BIA - The Soviets will send the ROA 500 Kamaz trucks, on easy & long-term credit, & donate 196 more to accelerate the shipment of petroleum to Kabul.

- PT - The interim gov't will send a delegation to the UNGA in a bid for a UN seat. Yunis Khalis will lead the group which will include Farooq Azam, the Education Minister, & Moh'd Yaaser, an adviser. Sayyaf will look after foreign affairs in the absence of Gulbuddin.

10/3 - PT - Pakistan & the USSR have reached an understanding on a draft resolution for action by the UNGA which calls for a political settlement to the Afghan situation. Meanwhile, Benazir Bhutto called on the mujahideen to broaden the base of their gov't & come up with a united stand.



Frontier Post
9/30

10/6 - Washington Times - An ROA defector said that Soviet pilots & new instructors for the promised MiG-29s were living in the Soviet Embassy in Kabul. He said some of the fliers are active in northern Afghanistan & have taken part in raids on Takhar, Maimana & Shiberghan.

Besides Afghan air force planes, Soviet "pilots are seen flying aircraft with Russian markings," he said.

Soviet warplanes sometimes fly directly from their bases in the Soviet Union "without prior notice," he said, adding that "when the Soviets are in the air, no Afghan jet enters the area."

He said the Kabul regime encourages this particularly in the extreme northern regions, "maybe because of fuel limitations."

- BIA - A memorial to Maulana Jalaluddin Balkhi, scholar & poet of Afghanistan, will be erected in Mazar-i-Sharif.

10/8 - BIA - The USSR & Finland will send 1,440 tons of wheat plus \$507,720 worth of other foodstuffs to Afghanistan under UN auspices. [It arrived in Hairatan on 10/17. Ed.]

10/9 - BIA - Nematullah Hekmati became the ROA's number 1 chess master, winning the chess-promoting competition which began last month.

10/10 - NYT - A US Gov't report on Afghanistan says that Soviet advisers are still involved in "all functions connected with the security, transportation, storage & launch of Scud missiles..." The Soviets wear Afghan uniforms. Special Afghan guard units patrol the perimeter of the missile base at Darulaman, but Afghan personnel are not allowed in the area. Special envoy Peter Tomsen said there were at least 300 Soviet military advisers in Afghanistan.

American officials say Afghanistan is receiving military supplies worth \$250 million to \$300 million a month from the Soviet Union. Since February, they say, at least 3,800 aircraft carrying food, fuel, weapons and ammunition have arrived in Afghanistan from the Soviet Union. • • •

American military aid to the Afghan guerrillas is estimated to have totaled \$600 million last year. The United States has spent more than \$2.3 billion arming the rebels over nine years, but the exact amounts are secret.

The same article, written by Robert Pear, says that Claiborne Pell, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, & other democrats say the war is stalemated & that the administration is not

doing enough toward seeking a political settlement.

An Administration official said "the Afghan interim government lacked legitimacy from the day it was created" by the rebels in February.

Mr. Pell agreed, saying the interim government was flawed by the manner of its selection, as a convention manipulated by Pakistan's intelligence services. The interim government "does not seem to have enough military clout or political support to oust" the Kabul Government, he said.

Twelve Republican members of Congress have sent a letter to the president of the Afghan interim government, Sibatullah Mojadedi, urging him to hold elections in refugee camps and "liberated areas of Afghanistan." Such elections would increase popular support for rebel leaders and enhance the international stature of their interim government, the letter said.



Prof. Mojadedi

- BIA - Protocols between the ROA & Iran led to the opening of a post office at the Islam Qala frontier. Mail will be exchanged every week on Wednesdays.

- A supply caravan full of wheat, sugar, oil, soap, etc., from the Soviet Union arrived in Kandahar from Herat.

- "Irshad-i-Islami" (Islamic Guidance), a weekly which was suspended for a while, will start publication tomorrow.

10/11 - BIA - To honor the birth of the Prophet, Najibullah pardoned a number of prisoners.

- There was a meeting of the "Commission of Urgent Aids of the Anti-Accident Dept." of the Council of Ministers to discuss the mass killing of civilians by extremist rockets.

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ABBREVIATIONS USED

AICMB	- Afghan Information Centre <u>Monthly Bulletin</u>
AWSJ	- Asian Wall Street Journal
BNA	- Bakhtar News Agency
CC	- Central Committee
CSM	- Christian Science Monitor
DYOA	- Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan
FRG	- Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	- German Democratic Republic
ICRC	- Int'l Committee of the Red Cross
KT	- Kabul Times
LAT	- Los Angeles Times
NGO	- Non Governmental Organization
NWFP	- Northwest Frontier Province
NYT	- New York Times
OIC	- Organization of Islamic Conference
PDPA	- People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PSFO	- Peace, Solidarity & Friendship Organization
PT	- Pakistan Times
PVO	- Private Voluntary Organization
RC	- Revolutionary Council
RTV	- Refugee Tent Village
SCMP	- South China Morning Post
UNGA	- United Nations General Assembly
UNGOMAP	- United Nations Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan & Pakistan
UNHCR	- United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WSJ	- Wall Street Journal

Line drawings from the 1982 Afghanistan Calendar of the Chicago Afghanistan Relief Committee.

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